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GOOD FAITH, STATE OF MIND, AND THE OUTER
BOUNDARIES OF DIRECTOR LIABILITY IN CORPORATE LAW

ChristopherM. Bruner*

The inability of Delaware's courts to identify what a corporate
director's core fiduciary duties are, let alone what the scope of those
duties might be, is one of the most pressing-and from a director's
point of view, distressing-issues in corporate law today.
After the fall of Enron and WorldCom, and particularly since
the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 ("Sarbanes-Oxley"),
lawmakers have only become more heavily reliant on the role of
independent "outside directors"-that is, directors independent of
the corporation and its management-to play what has effectively
become a regulatory role. A centerpiece of the Sarbanes-Oxley
reforms, for example, is the requirement that public companies have
audit committees to oversee the work of outside auditors and that
all members of the audit committee be "independent" as defined in
the Act.1 Sarbanes-Oxley also requires the Securities and Exchange
Commission ("SEC") to direct the securities exchanges "to prohibit
the listing of any security of an issuer that is not in compliance"
with this requirement.2 The New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
itself requires that a listed company's board have an independent
majority, who "must meet at regularly scheduled executive sessions
without management," and that the board have nominating/
corporate governance and compensation committees composed solely
* Assistant Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. A.B.,
University of Michigan; M.Phil., Oxford University; J.D., Harvard Law School.
Thanks to David Walker for helpful comments on an earlier draft, to David
Feldman for able research assistance, and to the editors of the Wake Forest
Law Review for editorial assistance. Any errors or omissions are, of course,
mine.
1. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 301, 116 Stat. 745,
775-77 (2002). Independence requires accepting no "consulting, advisory, or
other compensatory fee from the issuer" and not being an "affiliated person" of
the issuer or a subsidiary, other than by virtue of board membership.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301. For analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley reforms aimed at
corporate directors, see Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director?
Revitalizing Directors' Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 Hous. L.
REV. 393, 406-27 (2005).

2. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 301.
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of independent directors.3 Likewise, outside directors typically play
a particularly important governance role under corporate law. For
example,
disinterested
directors
sometimes
ratify
CEO
compensation (and that of the other board members) for a "measure
of legal insulation," and approval of a committee of disinterested
independent directors can provide similar protection in the context
of a controlled transaction between a corporate subsidiary and its
parent, shifting the burden to the plaintiff to demonstrate the
transaction's unfairness.4
While all corporate directors are subject to fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty (and, as discussed below, perhaps good faith)requiring that they exercise their power over corporate affairs with
reasonable diligence and in the best interests of the corporationthe fact that their role is effectively to invest on behalf of others has
been thought to give rise to the potential for substantial risk
aversion. Directors bear the downside costs of potential personal
liability, but only see a very small portion of any upside flowing from
the risks they direct the business to take.5 This problem is even
more acute in the case of outside directors, whose ownership stakes
are typically small relative to their net worth and even smaller
relative to the firm's value, and who typically "are busy people who
are modestly compensated for serving as directors relative to the
opportunity cost of their time."6 Thus, the risk aversion that might
simply have assumed the form of less willingness to take
entrepreneurial risks could, in the case of candidates for outside
director positions (who generally have day jobs and for whom the
gap between perceived downsides and upsides can be quite stark),
take the form of declining the position in the first place.7
3.

NYSE,

INC., LISTED COMPANY MANUAL

§§ 303A.01, 303A.03-303A.05

(2006). For the NYSE's strict independence requirements, see id. § 303A.02.
4. WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON
THE LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 313-14, 321 (2003) (observing, however,

that "compensation agreements are not subject to the ordinary law of director
conflicts").
5. Id. at 239-41.
6. Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability 5-6 (Stanford Law Sch.
John M. Olin Program in Law and Econ., Working Paper No. 250, 2003),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/-papers.cfm?abstractid=382422.
7. See, e.g., Michael Klausner et al., Outside Directors' Liability: Have
WorldCom and Enron Changed the Rules?, 71 STAN. LAW. 36, 39 (2005),

available at http://www.law.stanford.edu/publications/stanford lawyer/issues/
71/s171_klausner.pdf (suggesting that outside directors fearing out-of-pocket
liability could be more reluctant to accept a position on the board); see also
Lyman Johnson, After Enron: Remembering Loyalty Discourse in Corporate
Law, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 27 (2003) ("The wisdom of [using fiduciary duty law

to increase director accountability] will depend, in part, on whether the risk of
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The historical development of U.S. corporate law, or at least
corporate fiduciary duties, can be understood as an effort to
establish and continually recalibrate this balance between providing
a remedy for shareholders harmed by directors' wrongdoing, while
ensuring that qualified individuals will choose to fill corporate board
positions and take appropriate risks for the benefit of those same
shareholders. First and foremost, fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty serve the important purpose of minimizing "agency costs"that is, aligning the fiduciary's interests with those of the
individuals for whom they ultimately act 8 (in a corporation, the
greater financial exposure will induce enhanced discharge of director
responsibilities, to the advantage of shareholders, or dissuade capable
prospective director candidates from service, to the detriment of shareholders.").
It is widely accepted-and implicit here-that the presence of outside
directors is beneficial.
The optimal balance between outside and inside
directors on a corporate board remains, however, an open question. See
generally Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between Board
Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 IOwA J. CORP. L. 231, 233
(2002) (presenting empirical evidence that board independence is not correlated
with improved firm profitability); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The
Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance, 54
Bus. LAw. 921, 922 (1999) (observing that no studies provide strong evidence
that firms with majority-independent boards outperform other firms); Tod Perry
& Anil Shivdasani, Do Boards Affect Performance? Evidence from Corporate
Restructuring, 78 J. Bus. 1403, 1403 (2005) (finding that poorly performing
firms with a majority of independent outside directors were more likely to
undertake restructurings, and that subsequent performance at such firms
improved significantly); Dawna L. Rhoades et al., Board Composition and
FinancialPerformance: A Meta-Analysis of the Influence of Outside Directors,
XII:I J. MANAGERIAL IsSUES 76 (2000).
8. See ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note

4, at 31.
For additional
background on agency costs as a consequence of the division of corporate
ownership and control, see Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
FIN. ECON. 305 (1976).
See also Douglas M. Branson, The Very Uncertain
Prospect of "Global" Convergence in Corporate Governance, 34 CORNELL INT'L
L.J. 321, 359-62 (2001) (arguing that U.S.-style corporate governance,
responding to the separation of ownership and control and resulting agency
costs, is not needed at the multinational level because management and
shareholder interests are substantially aligned in that setting); Mark J. Roe,
Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53
STAN. L. REv. 539, 545-46 (2000) (arguing that U.S. firms are effectively
controlling agency costs, although they remain "not trivial").
I would not be understood to endorse as inevitable or appropriate the
relatively pure shareholder-wealth-maximization norm that prevails in the
United States; I employ the concept of agency costs to make a descriptive,
rather than prescriptive, statement about governance of U.S. corporations.
While the debate regarding whether corporate governance systems will
"converge" upon a global set of best practices remains open, it is clear that other
jurisdictions have settled upon perfectly coherent corporate legal systems
emphasizing the interests of other stakeholders to varying degrees. See, e.g.,
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shareholders)-through judicial scrutiny of the quality of
decisionmaking and the quality of intentions, respectively. The
specter of liability for well-intentioned business decisions, however,
resulting in the risk aversion described above, has given rise to the
so-called "business judgment rule" ("BJR"). The BJR, formulations
of which differ across jurisdictions, reflects universal judicial
aversion to querying decisions made by disinterested directors in
good faith.9 In Delaware, the jurisdiction of incorporation for over
half of U.S. public companies and almost sixty percent of the
Fortune 500,0 the BJR has been formulated as "a presumption that
in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on
an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company.""
In corporate law, this divergence between the standard of care,
on the one hand, and the standard of review for care breaches, on
the other, has rested on the straightforward policy rationale that the
benefits (entrepreneurial risk taking) exceed the costs (a monetary
remedy foregone). 12 In the 1980s, however, as the increasing
prevalence of hostile corporate takeovers led to concerns that
incumbent directors and officers of target companies might act to
preserve their own power rather than to maximize shareholder
value, the Delaware Supreme Court's jurisprudence began to incline
toward greater liability exposure. Ultimately, this resulted in the
crafting of forms of judicial scrutiny specific to the takeover context,
but in a notable 1985 opinion (Smith v. Van Gorkom"), now often
described as a preamble to that takeover jurisprudence, it was held
that disinterested directors could be found liable for monetary
damages for breach of their duty of care-a holding that literally

Branson, supra, at 361; Timothy L. Fort & Cindy A. Schipani, Corporate
Governance in a Global Environment: The Search for the Best of All Worlds, 33
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 829, 858-75 (2000) (exploring the potential for
convergence between the U.S. shareholder-primacy model and Japanese and
German communitarian models of corporate governance); Roe, supra, at 547-60.
But see Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for
Corporate Law, 89 GEO. L.J. 439 (2001) ("There is no longer any serious
competitor to the view that corporate law should principally strive to increase
long-term shareholder value.").
9. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 248.
10. See State of Delaware, Division of Corporations, http://www.state.de.us/
corp/default.shtml (last visited Nov. 13, 2006).
11. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (applying the BJR in
the context of demand futility analysis).
12. See William T. Allen et al., Realigning the Standard of Review of
DirectorDue Care with Delaware Public Policy: A Critique of Van Gorkom and
Its Progeny as a Standardof Review Problem, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 449, 451 (2002).
13. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
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14
shocked the business community.
Almost immediately, the Delaware legislature effectively
overruled the decision by amending the Delaware General
Corporation Law, in section 102(b)(7), to permit shareholders to
include exculpatory provisions in their corporate charters limiting or
eliminating directors' personal liability for duty of care breaches. 5
The statute, however, does not actually refer explicitly to the duty of
care; the drafters of section 102(b)(7) endeavored to achieve their
end indirectly, by specifying what could not be exculpated, including
(among other
things) breaches of the duty of loyalty and acts not in
"good faith."16 Notwithstanding the legislature's manifest desire to
limit directors' exposure to monetary liability, the manner in which
the statute was drafted essentially invited the interpretation of good
faith as a newly freestanding concept independent of the duty of
loyalty, of which it was previously thought to be a component. 7 The
murky nature of the concept, and the difficulty courts have
encountered in their efforts to imbue it with positive content
unrelated to the concept of loyalty, is discussed in detail in Part II,
but for the moment it will suffice to observe that plaintiffs' lawyers
(and courts) looking for means through which to expand potential
bases for director liability have had ample incentive to explore the
good faith concept as a promising basis for monetary recovery where
a company has an exculpatory charter provision and no financial
conflict of interest appears to be involved. As a consequence, a body
of case law exploring the meaning of good faith has emerged in
Delaware that, in seeking to stake out an independent conceptual
terrain not derivative of loyalty, has called into question the
meaning and scope of the primary fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty themselves.
This Article seeks to demonstrate that the Delaware courts and
legislature have-at each turn in this process of calibrating the
balance of directors' incentives--compounded complication upon
complication, resulting today in a fiduciary duty framework under
Delaware corporate law that is internally contradictory and
essentially unworkable. As Figure 1 illustrates in stylized form
(indicating the tendency of successive layers of the doctrine toward
lesser or greater liability, respectively), the effort to calibrate and
recalibrate directors' incentives and liability exposure has resulted
in a five-layered framework for assessing disinterested board
conduct. Doctrinal problems stemming from the ill-defined good

14.
15.

See ALLEN

& KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 518.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).

16. See infra text accompanying notes 52-68.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 69-83.
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faith concept represent only the latest development in a corporate
fiduciary duty doctrine that has grown by ad hoc accretion into an
overly complex framework raising theoretical and practical problems
out of all proportion to its benefits.

Figure 1:
Liability for Fiduciary Duty
Breaches by Disinterested Directors
"Good Faith" Jurisprudence
DGCL § 102(b)(7)
Van Gorkom (Broad Reading of
"Gross Negligence")
Business Judgment Rule
("Gross Negligence" Standard)
Duties of Care and Loyalty

Lesser Liability

Greater Liability

This Article's task is to diagnose the problems associated with
this regime and to propose a remedy in the form of a statutory
amendment that would eliminate the section 102(b)(7) exculpation
provision, replacing it with a provision permitting the imposition of
monetary liability only for loyalty breaches, defined to include cases
involving financial conflicts of interest, other improper personal
benefits, conscious malfeasance, and conscious nonfeasance, the
latter category representing those cases recently styled by the
Delaware courts as involving bad faith omissions." The proposed
regime would, in essence, discard the convoluted damages rule
represented by the several layers of doctrine presently superimposed

18. It bears emphasizing that in describing the proposed statutory
provision in such terms, I speak conceptually. The language employed might
take various acceptable forms, the intent being that the terminology differ from
the exculpation exceptions in Delaware's current section 102(b)(7) principally in
the respects discussed in this Article. Thus, for example, while it is arguably
subsumed conceptually by the other prongs of the proposed statute, a specific
exception for unlawful distributions might nevertheless be included, though at
least one Delaware jurist has expressed the view that this-like the other
exceptions to Delaware's section 102(b)(7)-simply represents a form of
disloyalty. See infra text accompanying note 142; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,

§ 174 (2001).
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on the core fiduciary duties, illustrated in Figure 1, in favor of a
more straightforward statutory provision representing their net
effect, illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2:
Director Liability for Fiduciary Breaches
in Delaware, Proposed Regime
Fiduciary Breaches
Care: monetary damages
not available
negligence-basedfiduciary

breaches

Loyalty: monetary damages
available
fiduciary breaches based on:

•
0
*
*

financial conflict of interest
other improper personal
benefit
conscious malfeasance
conscious nonfeasance

As I argue in Part IV, the proposed regime would track what
Delaware case law, fairly read, already permits with regard to
monetary liability for breaches of fiduciary duty, while offering
substantial benefits associated with a logically coherent system both
workable for courts and comprehensible by the market. It would
also remain consistent with what I argue is, and has been, the
functional distinction between duty of care analysis and duty of
loyalty analysis: the minimization of agency costs through
assessment of the quality of decisionmaking, on the one hand, and
the quality of intentions, on the other. The fiduciary duty of loyalty
always has been, and remains, broad enough to embrace the field of
the recent good faith cases, and this Article argues that the
conceptual line between care and loyalty offers the best hope for a
coherent doctrine of liability for fiduciary duty breaches by corporate
directors.
I.

DELAWARE'S BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND
FIDUCIARY DUTY ANALYSIS

Broadly speaking, the BJR reflects substantial reluctance on
the part of judges to substitute their own business judgment for that
of corporate boards. Notwithstanding that corporate directors owe a
duty of care to the corporation, typically expressed in the standard
negligence terminology of reasonable prudence under the
circumstances, the BJR has historically operated to remove the
specter of liability for damages resulting from business decisions
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made by disinterested directors in "good faith."
As a first
approximation it is probably fair to define good faith as requiring
"an honest judgment seeking to advance the corporation's
interests"' 9 (bearing in mind that its evolving meaning under
Delaware case law is a matter of considerable controversy and will
constitute the principal subject of the latter portion of this Article).
Though formulations of the BJR differ across jurisdictions, the
Delaware Supreme Court has described it as "a presumption that in
making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an
informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company." 20 In 1984 in
Aronson v. Lewis, the court explained that the BJR protects only
disinterested directors and that it applies only to directors' actions,
not "where directors have either abdicated their functions, or absent
a conscious decision, failed to act."21
However, a director's
disinterestedness with respect to board action would not be enough
to ensure insulation from liability. The court further stated that "to
invoke the rule's protection directors have a duty to inform
themselves, prior to making a business decision, of all material
information reasonably available to them," and then to "act with
requisite care in the discharge of their duties."22 That is, the BJR
could be overcome-at least in theory-solely by reference to the
care exercised by the board in informing itself and arriving at a
decision.
As to the actual standard for overcoming the BJR in this
manner, however, the Aronson court found the cases to be less than
clear. Interestingly, while a couple of the cases cited by the court
drew the line at "grossly negligent" conduct or "reckless
indifference," most of the cases cited by the court used verbal
formulae pointing toward a more culpable mental state, such as
"fraud," "gross overreaching," "bad faith," "misconduct," and the
like. 3 Nevertheless, the court took from this authority only that
"director liability is predicated on a standard which is less exacting
than simple negligence," and concluded that "under the business
judgment rule director liability is predicated upon concepts of gross

19. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN,supra note 4, at 248-53; see also, e.g., Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 889 (Del. 1985) (characterizing the issue of "good faith"
in BJR analysis as whether the board made "an honest exercise of business
judgment").
20. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (applying the BJR in
the context of demand futility analysis).
21. Id. at 812-13.
22. Id. at 812.
23. Id. at 812 n.6 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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negligence."24
In other words, the Aronson court resolved the
preexisting ambiguity by setting the bar for overcoming the BJR
relatively lower, styling the choice as between simple negligence or a
"less exacting" standard, without asking whether the case law had
in fact permitted the BJR to be overcome by a showing of anything
short of disloyalty.
In essence the court had simply traded one form of ambiguity
for another; while a single articulation of the standard might have
seemed like a step in the right direction, the formulation chosen was
itself a highly ambiguous one.
Setting aside whether gross
negligence adequately summarizes the range of prior formulations
identified by the court, the range of conduct intended to be captured
by the gross negligence concept is, at the margin, notoriously
difficult to identify even in abstract terms. Black's Law Dictionary,
for example, offers the following insights: "It is materially more
want of care than constitutes simple inadvertence ....
The element
of culpability which characterizes all negligence is in gross
negligence magnified to a high degree as compared with that
present in ordinary negligence."26 Put differently, gross negligence
is negligence that is gross.27 The BJR's gross negligence standard
has been interpreted as allowing courts to "articulate a duty of
'reasonable care' but enforce a more director protective standard."2 8
That may be correct, but as would become clear within a year of the
court's restyling of the doctrine in Aronson, this blurring of the
distinction between the duty itself and the liability standard 29 would
also obscure the very purpose of the BJR, by suggesting that
negligence-if only the gross variety (whatever that might come to
mean)-could, alone, give rise to monetary liability for a director's
breach of the duty of care.' °
A.

Van Gorkom, D&O Insurance, and Market Perception

The story of Trans Union's ill-fated dealings with takeover
artist Jay Pritzker is a fascinating one, though a lengthy one. It is

24. Id.

25. See infra notes 39, 224.
26. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1033 (6th ed. 1990); see also infra text
accompanying note 37.
27. See, e.g., Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 508 n.39 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(Strine, Vice Chancellor, unable to confirm, as of 2003, "[ilf gross negligence
means something other than negligence").
28. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 254 n.17.
29. Id. at 253.
30. Cf Allen et al., supra note 12, at 458-60 (arguing that the court
subsequently applied a simple negligence standard rather than the gross
negligence standard announced in Aronson).
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sufficient for present purposes to observe that the manner in which
Trans Union's board approved its merger into a Pritzker-controlled
entity hardly reflected ideal corporate governance practice. Without
copies of the proposed merger agreement available, and based
principally on a twenty-minute presentation by Trans Union
Chairman and CEO Jerome Van Gorkom, the board approved the
merger.3 ' Van Gorkom-who was a shareholder fast approaching
retirement, had not read the agreement himself, and was an
acquaintance of Pritzker-had negotiated largely without board or
management knowledge.32 The $55 per share price agreed upon
(representing a substantial premium over Trans Union's market
price, which had ranged from $24 to $39 per share over the prior
five years) had been suggested by Van Gorkom to Pritzker (not viceversa), and Van Gorkom had arrived at the price, not by reference to
any valuation study, but based on the feasibility of a leveraged
buyout at that price--a fact not disclosed to the board. 33 The
agreement purported to provide for a ninety-day market test to
confirm price validity, though it placed onerous restrictions on
Trans Union's capacity to negotiate with others.34
The ensuing shareholder class action suit came before the
Delaware Supreme Court on appeal from the Court of Chancery's
determination that the board's actions were protected by the BJR.
In its own opinion, which came down in January 1985, the Delaware
Supreme Court began with the observation that "there were no
allegations of fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing," such that
"considerations of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us." 35

The BJR analysis would focus solely on the issue of care, and the
court reiterated its view that gross negligence was the applicable
standard.3 6 Little illumination of the meaning of gross negligence
was offered, save additional citations to Chancery opinions stating
the standard as being whether the board acted "without the bounds
of reason and recklessly" or "so far without information that they
can be said to have passed an unintelligent and unadvised
judgment." 7
31. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 868-69 (Del. 1985).
32. Id. at 866-87, 869.
33. Id. at 866-69.
34. Id. at 868-70.
35. Id. at 873 (citing Allaun v. Consol. Oil Co., 147 A. 257 (1929)).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 873 n.13 (citing standards articulated in Gimbel v. Signal
Companies, Inc., 316 A.2d 599, 615 (Del. Ch. 1974), and Mitchell v. HighlandWestern Glass Co., 167 A. 831, 833 (Del. Ch. 1933), respectively, evidently in
support of its conclusion that "the concept of gross negligence is ... the proper
standard for determining whether a business judgment reached by a board of
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The Delaware Supreme Court found that the board had, in fact,
been grossly negligent in approving the merger; that subsequent
amendments to the agreement were not helpful (as they only tended
to further lock Trans Union into the deal); that subsequent board
consideration of the deal did not cure the problem (as the board
lacked the ability to withdraw from the agreement by that point);
and that shareholder approval of the merger likewise was
unavailing (as the vote was uninformed, particularly with respect to
price).38
The business community-and perhaps more pertinently, their
insurers-were shocked by the outcome in Van Gorkom.
Notwithstanding the ambiguities that Aronson had introduced into
the doctrine and the haste with which the Trans Union board had
acted, commentators at the time simply did not, by and large, view
Delaware's BJR as permitting the imposition of board liability for
damages solely by reference to the quality of decisionmaking.39 In
this light, Van Gorkom appeared not to have applied the BJR so
much as to have eviscerated it.4 The decision's formalism was
widely criticized, particularly in light of the prominence of Trans
Union's board members, their depth of background knowledge on
the company, the substantial premium involved, and the low
probability that an investment bank opinion to the effect that $55
per share was a fair price could not have been procured. 4' The case
directors was an informed one") (internal quotation marks omitted).
38. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874-93.
39. William Allen and Reinier Kraakman indicate that they have identified
no pre-Van Gorkom case (outside the banking context)
in which directors who have no conflicting interests and who attend
meetings and deliberate before authorizing a transaction are held
personally liable for breach of a duty of care, let alone a case in which
they are held liable for approving a sale of the company at a 50
percent premium to market price.
ALLEN & KRAAKMAN,supra note 4, at 518 n.17.
40. See, e.g., Daniel R. Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans
Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437, 1445 (1985) (discussing "the rejection of the
business judgment rule as the proper standard of judicial review in the Trans
Union case"); Bayless Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the
Boardroom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1, 1 (1985) (describing Van Gorkom
as having "pierced the business judgment rule"); cf DAVID A. DREXLER ET AL., 115 DELAWARE CORPORATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 15.06 (2004) (observing that
liability was imposed "for conduct which to many observers seemed wholly
undeserving of the characterization 'gross negligence,"' the dissent arguing that
their conduct did not amount even to simple negligence).
41. See, e.g., Fischel, supra note 40, at 1453 (quipping, "I wish someone
would pay me several hundred thousand dollars to state that $55 is greater
than $35"); Leo Herzel & Leo Katz, Smith v. Van Gorkom: The Business of
Judging Business Judgment, 41 Bus. LAW. 1187, 1191 (1986) (arguing that Van
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accordingly "provoked intense concern in many corporate
boardrooms,"42 the "corporate bar generally view[ed] the decision as
atrocious," and "[c]ommentators predict[ed] dire consequences as
directors [came] to realize how exposed they [had] become." 4
Corporate lawyers decried the "much greater randomness and
unpredictability on the part of future courts passing on future board
decisions,"" and carriers of directors and officers ("D&O") insurance
found themselves surveying a landscape in which "the perceived
rules of the game" had changed.
Indeed, the D&O insurance industry46 had already been lapsing
into a crisis. In the early 1980s, increased merger and acquisition
("M&A") activity, initial public offering ("IPO") activity, and
business failure had, together, resulted in a spike in shareholder
litigation against corporate boards. 4' The costs of claims increased
significantly, and by late 1984 the D&O insurance industry had
fallen into "severe dislocation," reflected in significantly higher
premia, higher deductibles, lower policy limits, and a narrower
scope of coverage. 41 Some insurers simply left the market, and "[als
market capacity declined, some corporations claimed to be unable to
obtain the coverage they desired at any price."4 9 Enter Van Gorkom,
which "exemplifie[d] the legal uncertainty that contributed to the
insurance crisis; most practitioners, like the lower court, would have
Gorkom would result in "greater formalism on the part of the board, as it goes
about the business of cultivating an aura of care, diligence, thoroughness, and
circumspection," and that this would "mean more reliance on and more fees for
lawyers, investment bankers, accountants," and others). Herzel's law firm had
in fact played a role in the acquisition at issue in Van Gorkom, representing the
lenders involved. See Kirk Victor, Rhetoric Is Hot When the Topic Is Takeovers,
LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 23/30, 1985, at 2.
42. John F. Olson & J. Keith Morgan, D&O Exclusions Extend To Takeover
Context, LEGAL TIMES, Mar. 10, 1986, at 23.

43.
44.
45.
46.

Manning, supra note 40, at 1.
Herzel & Katz, supra note 41, at 1190.
Olson & Morgan, supra note 42, at 23.
Delaware's corporate law permits companies to purchase insurance for

its directors, officers, employees, and agents "against any liability ...

arising

out of such person's status as such, whether or not the corporation would have
the power to indemnify such person against such liability." DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 145(g) (2001). The latter clause is important, among other reasons, in light
of section 145's preclusion of indemnification for judgments in derivative suits.
See id. § 145(b); see also infra note 240 and accompanying text.
47. Roberta Romano, Corporate Governance in the Aftermath of the
Insurance Crisis, 39 EMORY L.J. 1155, 1158 (1990).
48. Id.

49. Id. See also Olson & Morgan, supra note 42, at 28 (providing a detailed
discussion of specific changes in D&O coverage, including the use of "a new
hostile takeover exclusion," and the corporate response to these developments).

2006]

DELAWARE DIRECTOR LIABILITY

1143

predicted that the facts in Van Gorkom would not constitute gross
negligence under Delaware's duty of care standard."50 Matters only
looked worse when, following remand, the case settled for $23.5
million, $13.5 million beyond Trans Union's $10 million D&O policy
limit. '
B.

Politics and the Delaware GeneralAssembly: § 102(b)(7)

As of late 1985, pressure was mounting on Delaware's
legislature to intervene.
One commentator observed that
Delaware's recent corporate governance jurisprudence had resulted
in "almost complete frustration among those who search the
decisions for consistency and predictability," that the Delaware
legislature was not taking action to cope with the "near chaos in
corporate legal policy," and that the business community should
"reconsider anew alternatives to our American corporate
Ruritania."52 By late March 1986, the Delaware Bar Association's
influential corporate law section was "seriously considering making
recommendations to amend the state corporate law" 5 -perhaps
prompted by a new Indiana statute (effective April 1, 1986)
expressly limiting director liability to cases involving recklessness or
willful misconduct. Consensus with respect to action in Delaware
was difficult to reach, however, as lawyers within and without the
state variously advocated differing liability caps and forms of
exculpation. Corporate law section chairman Gilchrist Sparks,
unsure whether consensus could be achieved in time to get a
proposal to the Delaware legislature before the end of its session in
50. Romano, supra note 47, at 1160. At least one commentator suggested
that the outcome in Van Gorkom was even more difficult to comprehend in light
of the fact that the BJR had been found to apply to the Aronson facts, "even
though the directors were elected by a control person and their decisions were
to grant him compensation he desired in excess of all perceptible reason." See
Michael R. Klein, Delaware's Corporate Citadel: We Could Do Better, LEGAL
TIMES, Dec. 16, 1985, at 9.
51.

See Mary Ann Galante, The D&O Crisis: Corporate Boardroom Woes

Grow, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 4, 1986, at 29; Olson & Morgan, supra note 42, at 28.
While most of the $13.5 million beyond the policy limit was actually paid by the
Pritzkers, some was paid by the directors themselves. See Victor, supra note
41, at 2.
52. Klein, supra note 50.
53. Kirk Victor, Statutory Response to D&O Crisis Studied, LEGAL TIMES,
Mar. 31, 1986, at 1; see also Leo Herzel & Daniel Harris, Uninsured Boards
Mount Weak Defense, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 21, 1986, at 37; IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-351(e) (LexisNexis 1999). In 1989, Indiana's statute was amended to reject
explicitly the Delaware court's BJR jurisprudence as "inconsistent with the
proper application of the business judgment rule under this Article." Id. § 23-135-1(f).
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June 1986, observed that "[w]e don't want to destroy the efficacy of
the derivative suit, but on the other hand, we want directors to
continue to sit on boards and take appropriate risks."54
By mid-May, however, the Delaware Bar Association reportedly
was close to settling on "proposed amendments [that would] allow
shareholders to place a ceiling on their directors' personal financial
exposure in lawsuits by shareholders and other parties."5' According
to one press account (citing a "prominent Wilmington corporate
attorney"), once the Bar Association approved the amendment, it
would make its way to the Delaware legislature and, if "customary
practice" were any indication, it would "pass easily., 56 Ultimately it
did pass, the new section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law being
signed by the governor on June 18, 1986 and
57
going effective July 1.
While it would come to be described colloquially as permitting
exculpation of director liability for breaches of the duty of care, the
operation of the new statute was not so straightforward as that.
The language of section 102(b)(7) provided that a Delaware
corporation's charter could include a "provision eliminating or
limiting the personal liability of a director to the corporation or its
stockholders for monetary damages for breach of fiduciary duty,"
except that exculpation would not be permitted for certain
enumerated types of conduct. 5 Those exceptions included: (1) "any
breach of the director's duty of loyalty," (2) "acts or omissions not in
good faith or which involve intentional misconduct or a knowing
violation of law," (3) unlawful distributions, and (4) "any transaction
from which the director derived an improper personal benefit." 9
That the statute is intended to permit exculpation of care violations
is obvious; care is not among the exceptions to exculpation. Beyond
that, however, the relative meanings of, and interrelationship
among, the various exceptions is far from clear-a problem that,

54. See Victor, supra note 53, at 5 (internal quotation marks omitted); see
also R. FRANKLIN BALOTTI & JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN,

DELAWARE LAW OF

4.29, pp. 4-110 to 4-111 (3d ed. 2004
supp.) (outlining various proposals considered).
55. Michael A. Hiltzik, In Tiny Delaware, Major Corporations Find a
Refuge Away from Home, L.A. TIMES, May 19, 1986, § 4, at 1.
56. Id. Roberta Romano has cited this story as the "first story referring to
the limited liability provision after it became clear that it would be
recommended." Romano, supra note 47, at 1185 n.50.
57. Francine Schwadel, Delaware Provides Help on Insurance for Some
Directors, WALL ST. J., June 19, 1986, at 16; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
102(b)(7) (2001).
58. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).
59. Id.
CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS

§
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given Delaware's influence in the field of corporate law, has
propagated itself elsewhere.
(The Appendix provides summary
tables reflecting both the prevalence of statutory exculpation, and
the role of Delaware's section 102(b)(7) as a model, across the United
States.60 ) Notably, as one Vice Chancellor would later put it, "its
subparts all illustrate conduct that is disloyal,"61 as that term has
traditionally been understood, rendering it difficult to ascribe
distinct conceptual content to each of the exculpation exceptions.
The legislative history confirms that section 102(b)(7)
"represent[ed] a legislative response to recent changes in the market
for directors' liability insurance." 62 Such coverage had "become a
relatively standard condition of employment for directors," and in
the legislature's view, the lack of coverage had "threatened the
quality and stability of the governance of Delaware corporations
because directors [had] become unwilling, in many instances, to
serve without the protection which such insurance provides and, in
other instances, may be deterred by the unavailability of insurance
from making entrepreneurial decisions."63 Statutory exculpation

60. As the Appendix tables reflect, the vast majority of states permit
exculpation. The problematic bifurcation of "loyalty" and "good faith" into
separate categories appears in the statutes of eighteen other states, while most
of the remaining states permitting exculpation appear generally to have
followed the Revised Model Business Corporation Act (the pertinent provision of
which does not distinguish between loyalty and good faith). See infra Appendix:
Exculpation Statutes by Type; see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 2.02(b)(4)
(2000). There is considerable variation with respect to the form and substance
of the remaining exculpation statutes not falling into these two broad
categories. Most differ in the phrasing and scope of their exceptions, though
some differ more structurally. Connecticut's statute, for instance, permits the
limitation of liability "to an amount not less than the compensation received"
from the corporation that year, while under New Mexico's statute the level of
culpability required to trigger the exculpation exception decreases as a
director's ownership interest and remuneration increase. See infra Appendix:
Exculpation Statutes by Type, Table 3. Most of the states not permitting
exculpation have statutory provisions limiting director liability, though the
statutes of Nevada and Ohio permit corporations to increase liability exposure
through their charters. See infra Appendix: Exculpation Statutes by Type,
Table 4.
61. Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 n.34 (Del. Ch. 2003) (Strine, Vice
Chancellor); see also Allen et al., supra note 12, at 463 n.46 ("The statutory
examples of conduct that cannot be exculpated under [section] 102(b)(7) are all,
in our opinion, examples of loyalty violations.").
62. Chapter 289, Laws of 1986: § 102.
Contents of certificate of
incorporation, Comment (Del. 1986), reprinted in 2 R. FRANKLIN BALOTrI &
JESSE A. FINKELSTEIN, DELAWARE LAW OF CORPORATIONS & BUSINESS
ORGANIZATIONS 1-12 (3d ed. 2005 supp.).
63. Id.
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would permit corporations to "provide substitute protection.
Neither the statute nor the legislative comment, however, offers any
interpretive guidance with respect to the exceptions .65
Section 102(b)(7)'s exceptions appear even less coherent before
the backdrop of available alternatives proposed at the time.
Indiana's statute, for example, had simply revised the standard of
care, a move not requiring the expense and complication of one-off
corporate charter amendments.66 (By contrast, in Delaware more
than ninety percent of corporations would, within a single year of
section 102(b)(7)'s adoption, opt into the exculpation regime by
amending their charters, one

at a time.67)

With respect

to

exculpation, the Restatement (Second) of Trusts approach had also
been identified as a potential model. Trustees could-under the

64. Id.; see also Galante, supra note 51, at 30 (quoting Sparks' remark that
the "main idea" of section 102(b)(7) was "to put directors back in the position

they were in" before the D&O crisis) (internal quotations marks omitted);
Schwadel, supra note 57, at 1 (reporting that Sparks, "who helped draft the
bill," had indicated that the intent was to ensure retention of outside directors).
Empirical studies regarding the effects of liability limitation report mixed
results. See, e.g., Yaron Brook & Ramesh K. S. Rao, ShareholderWealth Effects
of Directors' Liability Limitation Provisions, 29 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALYsIs 481,
481 (1994) ("[Aldoption of liability limitation provisions . . . is associated with

insignificant stock price reactions for all firms, but with positive stock price
reactions for poorly performing firms."); Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G.
Lewellen, An EmpiricalAnalysis of the Reincorporation Decision, 33 J. FIN. &
QUANT. ANALYsIs 549, 549 (1998) ("[Slhareholder wealth . . . is increased by

reincorporations that establish limits on director liability."); Vahan Janjigian &
Paul J. Bolster, The Eliminationof DirectorLiability and Stockholder Returns:
An Empirical Investigation, 13 J. FIN. REs. 53, 60 (1990) ("[L]iability

elimination does not have a significant impact upon shareholder wealth.").
65. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of
Rhetoric in Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1, 14 (2005); John L.
Reed & Matt Neiderman, "Good Faith"and the Ability of Directors to Assert
Section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law as a Defense to
Claims Alleging Abdication, Lack of Oversight, and Similar Breaches of
FiduciaryDuty, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 111, 119 (2004).
66. IND. CODEANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (LexisNexis 1999).
67. Romano, supra note 47, at 1160-61 (citing data from "a random sample
of 180 Delaware firms"); see also DREXLER ET AL., supra note 40, at § 6.02 n.58
(reporting that during "the one-year period from September 1, 1986 through
August 31, 1987, 4,206 charter amendments or restated certificates of
incorporation containing director liability provisions were filed by the Secretary
of State," and that "13,697 new certificates of incorporation with director
liability provisions" were filed). Romano further notes that within two years,
forty-one states had amended their corporate law statutes "to reduce directors'
liability exposure," many following the Delaware approach. Romano, supra
note 47, at 1160. By 2003, all fifty states had done so. See Fairfax, supra note
1, at 412 & n.105; see also infra Appendix: Exculpation Statutes by Type.
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terms of the trust-"be relieved of liability for breach of trust," save
only where the breach was "committed in bad faith or intentionally
or with reckless indifference to the interest of the beneficiary," or
where involving "liability for any profit which the trustee has
derived from a breach of trust."68 Though superficially similar to
section 102(b)(7) in structure, there is a crucial difference: The trust
law approach presents bad faith, reckless, and intentional
misconduct as forms of breach of trust generally evocative of
disloyalty, whereas the structure ultimately adopted in section
102(b)(7) tends to characterize such forms of conduct as their own
categories of fiduciary breach somehow distinct from the concept of
disloyalty.
C. FiduciaryDuties in the Post-Van Gorkom, Pre-§ 102(b)(7)
Window
Meanwhile, in the eighteen-month period between the Van
Gorkom decision (January 1985) and the passage of section 102(b)(7)
(June 1986), the Delaware Supreme Court turned its attention to
the increasingly controversial hostile takeover context. Two cases,
in particular, are of interest for purposes of this discussion because
they shed light on the court's conception of the framework of
corporate fiduciary duty law in Delaware on the eve of section
102(b)(7)'s passage in 1986.
Even though Van Gorkom involved a corporate takeover, it
purported to be a duty of care case.69 In its June 1985 Unocal Corp.
v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 7 0 opinion, however, the Delaware Supreme
Court began to fashion a framework for the analysis of fiduciary
breaches specific to the takeover context. The case involved a
coercive two-tier tender offer, and the primary legal issue was "the
validity of [Unocal's] self-tender for its own shares which exclude[d]
from participation [the] stockholder making [the] hostile tender
offer."'" The court found that the board in fact could take such
action, but in so doing articulated a new test. While the BJR applies
in the takeover context, "the omnipresent specter that a board may
be acting primarily in its own interests"-given the threat to the
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 222 (1959); see also Herzel &
Harris, supra note 53 (identifying this Restatement provision in April 1986 as a
useful model for exculpation under Delaware corporate law). Herzel and Harris
also point to an interesting Delaware Chancery case from 1910 establishing the
acceptability of an exculpatory charter provision that simply eliminates director
and officer liability except where arising "through his own dishonesty." Id.; In
re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates, Ltd., 1 Del. Ch.425 (1910).
69. ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 518.
70. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
71. Id. at 949.
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incumbents' positions-gives rise to "an enhanced duty which calls
for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of
the [BJR] may be conferred."72 Specifically, the board "may not have
acted solely or primarily out of a desire to perpetuate themselves in
office," and the "defensive 73measure . . . must be reasonable in
relation to the threat posed."

Though the court presents its new test specifically as a response
to the conflict directors inevitably face when their control is
challenged, it is worth observing that the court clearly linked the
notion of good faith with the demonstration of loyalty. The court
observed that "directors must show that they had reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and
effectiveness existed because of another person's stock ownership,"
and that "they satisfy that burden 'by showing good faith and
reasonable investigation. "'

Though the court leaves good faith

undefined, it clearly conceptualizes good faith as distinct from the
reasonableness of the investigation-which would go to care-and as
evincing the actuality of the belief in a danger to corporate policy
required to demonstrate loyalty under these circumstances.
The court's March 1986 Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc.5 opinion addressed the validity of defensive measures
aimed at preventing Pantry Pride, Inc., from acquiring Revlonwhile aiding rival suitor Forstmann Little & Co.-in the midst of
what had become a bidding war for Revlon. 6 Citing Aronson and
Unocal as the basis for its analysis,77 the court determined that once
bidding was underway and it became clear that the company "was
for sale," such that "the break-up of the company was inevitable,"
the board's responsibility under Unocal "changed from the
preservation of Revlon as a corporate entity to the maximization of
the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefit."78 In this
light, the court found that a lock-up agreement entered with
Forstmann, which involved waiving restrictive covenants in certain
outstanding debt securities, but then bolstering their market price
to prevent litigation (even though there was no suggestion that the
terms of the debt had been violated), constituted a breach of the
72. Id. at 954.
73. Id. at 955; see also Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 138788 (Del. 1995) (restyling the standard as being whether a defensive measure is
"preclusive or coercive," and if not, whether it falls within a "range of
reasonableness").
74. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955 (citations omitted).
75. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
76. Id. at 176.
77. Id. at 180 (citations omitted).
78. Id. at 182.
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board's duty of loyalty-by calling into question the board's good
faith under Unocal.7 9 The court observed that
the Revlon board could not make the requisite showing of good
faith by preferring the noteholders and ignoring its duty of
loyalty to the shareholders. .

.

. [Wihen the Revlon board

entered into an auction-ending lock-up agreement with
Forstmann on the basis of impermissible considerations at the
expense of the shareholders, the directors breached their
primary duty of loyalty.8 °
Thus, the Delaware Supreme Court, on the eve of section 102(b)(7)'s
passage, essentially treats failure to demonstrate good faith-here,
in the form of intent actively to pursue the best interests of
shareholders by maximizing the sale price in a bidding war-as
tantamount to a failure 8to establish compliance with the board's
"primary duty of loyalty."

1

The court did find a breach of the directors' duty of care (citing
Van Gorkom) to have resulted from the lock-up agreement as wellnamely, in "follow[ing] a course that ended the auction for Revlon
. .. to the ultimate detriment of [Revlon's] shareholders. 8 2 This
finding occasions two observations. First, in this opinion coming
down just months before the passage of section 102(b)(7), the
Delaware Supreme Court identifies two core fiduciary duties: loyalty
and care. Second, though the loyalty and care violations both arise
from the same conduct, there is an important (if subtle) distinction
between the two. Whereas the loyalty violation, as described above,
clearly flows from the directors' state of mind-i.e., basing their
decision on "impermissible considerations" and thereby failing to
demonstrate their good faith vis-A-vis the shareholders' intereststhe care violation flows from the decision itself-i.e., "follow[ing] a
course" that in fact redounds to the benefit of non-shareholders, at
79. Id. at 182-84.
80. Id. at 182 (emphasis added).
81. Id. Revlon's defensive actions had included an exchange offer, in which
notes and convertible preferred stock were issued in exchange for common
stock. The notes "contained covenants which limited Revlon's ability to incur
additional debt, sell assets, or pay dividends unless otherwise approved by the
'independent' (non-management) members of the board"-a move that "stymied
Pantry Pride's attempted takeover," which required external financing.
Following the announcement of a leveraged buyout by Forstmann, however,
under which Revlon would "waive the Notes covenants for Forstmann," the
market value of the notes fell and "threats of litigation by these creditors" were
reported in The Wall Street Journal. In a subsequent offer, then, "[iun return"
for various concessions by Revlon's board, "Forstmann agreed to support the par
value of the Notes... by an exchange of new notes." Id. at 177-79.
82. Id. at 185.
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the shareholders' expense."
This distinction is not rendered semantic simply by virtue of the
fact that both ultimately aim for the maximization of shareholder
value. It is a straightforward reflection of the fact that loyalty and
care are two analytical means toward that same end, the former
operating through assessment of the fiduciary's subjective state of
mind when the relevant act or omission occurred, and the latter
operating through assessment of the objective characteristics of the
board's decisionmaking. Loyalty and care only appear to conflate in
Revlon because the board essentially announces that it is acting in
the interests of a non-shareholder constituency. Indeed, that the
court would have bothered to draw the distinction at all in such a
case-rather than simply referring generically to a breach of
fiduciary duty-is an indication of the degree to which this
analytical structure was embedded in the court's jurisprudence as
late as March 1986.
II.

FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN THE POST-§ 102(b)(7) WORLD

Notwithstanding the Delaware Supreme Court's fiduciary duty
jurisprudence, section 102(b)(7) was drafted in a manner suggesting
that, according to the Delaware legislature, "breach of the director's
duty of loyalty" must consist of something other than "acts or
omissions not in good faith," "intentional misconduct," "knowing
violation[s] of law," improper declaration of dividends, and
transactions involving "an improper personal benefit" to the
director. 4 As discussed in Part I.B-C, it is quite difficult to imagine
how the duty of loyalty might be defined to include none of these
forms of wrongdoing, but in any event the statute remains in place.
The vast majority of Delaware corporations have adopted
exculpatory charter provisions pursuant to the authority it grants,
and courts must deal with it as best they can.
In this Part, I argue that the Delaware Supreme Court has bent
over backward since the early 1990s to accommodate the common
law to the statute's internally contradictory language, and that the
court's effort to cram fiduciary concepts into the ill-fitting statutory
boxes (aided by creative pleading practices among the plaintiffs'
bar") has left Delaware's fiduciary duty framework analytically
83. Id.
84. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001); see also Griffith, supra note
65, at 14.
85. Roberta Romano observed in 1990 that "the plaintiffs' bar did not
oppose the new legislation" passed in Delaware and elsewhere, and that "the
statutes' effectiveness will depend on how courts interpret them." She
presciently speculated that plaintiffs would "be careful to bring their complaints
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incoherent.
A.

Delaware's"Triad"Framework
As of the late 1980s the court continued to employ the good faith
concept in tandem with the duty of loyalty, while beginning to refer
to good faith in a manner that might arguably tend to imbue it with
the status of an independent duty. In Citron v. FairchildCamera &
Instrument Corp.,86 for example, several of Fairchild's directors were
"charged with breach of their fiduciary duties of good faith and due
care and with gross negligence" in recommending acceptance of a
tender offer made by a party allegedly favored by interested
management, rather than the offer of another bidder. Whether the
reference to a duty of good faith is intended simply as a synonym for
loyalty, or to indicate that it is a self-standing duty, is never made
clear, though the court's analysis would tend to indicate the former.
In its BJR analysis, the court never contrasts good faith with the
duty of loyalty in a manner that would indicate self-standing duty
status. The court explains that to overcome the BJR, for instance,
the plaintiff must "introduc[e] evidence either of director selfinterest, if not self-dealing, or that the directors either lacked good
faith or failed to exercise due care."8'8 Here, bad faith could simply
be understood as another form of loyalty violation apart from selfinterest. Indeed, with respect to the specific allegation in Citron,
the court links the two when it explains that "plaintiff obliquely
asserts a claim of lack of good faith by Fairchild's board for its
alleged failure to act independently of interested management" (a
claim plaintiff fails to establish on the facts).
Any doubts that Justice Horsey may have harbored regarding
the status of good faith at the time of his 1989 Citron opinion,
however, were gone by 1993. In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.,90
also written by Justice Horsey, the court explains: "To rebut the
[BJR], a shareholder plaintiff assumes the burden of providing
evidence that directors, in reaching their challenged decision,
breached any one of the triads [sic] of their fiduciary duty-good
faith, loyalty or due care." 91
within the included liability categories and will allege recklessness or willful
misconduct rather than negligence." Romano, supra note 47, at 1161-62.
86. 569 A.2d 53 (Del. 1989).
87. Id. at 54. The events described in the case occurred prior to the
passage of section 102(b)(7).
88. Id. at 64 (citing Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985)).
89. Id. at 64-65.
90. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
91. Id. at 361 (citing Citron, Van Gorkom, and Aronson without
explanation).
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The court never explains, however, what this duty of good faith
amounts to in concrete terms. In fact, the court cites "abdication of
directorial duty" as an example of disloyal conduct 2 (that is, the
very type of conduct alleged in Citron to have demonstrated bad
faith), and later remarks that the "[d]uty of care and duty of loyalty
are the traditional hallmarks of a fiduciary who endeavors to act in
the service of a corporation and its stockholders."93 The court even
equates "good faith" and "loyalty" by inserting the latter in brackets
following the former in quoted language from another case,
presumably indicating that the two essentially meant the same
thing.94 Ultimately, it is impossible to discern from Cede what
meaning good faith might have apart from loyalty, but it is equally
impossible to deny that the Delaware Supreme Court had elevated it
(at least nominally) to the status of a core fiduciary duty, as part of
the new triad with care and loyalty.
References to the so-called triad of fiduciary duties would
continue to pop up in subsequent opinions, though never,
unfortunately, accompanied by anything approaching a coherent
description of what positive content could be ascribed to the duty of
good faith. For example, in Malone v. Brincat,95 a case addressing
directors' disclosure obligations under state corporate law, the court
invokes the triad but applies it in a manner that renders the
distinction between good faith and loyalty indiscernible.9 6 The court
observes that the general "duty of directors to observe proper
disclosure requirements [when shareholder action is sought] derives
from the combination of the fiduciary duties of care, loyalty and good
faith,"97 but that "knowingly" misleading shareholders (regardless of
whether shareholder action is sought) requires a different analysis.
In such instance, the court explains, the issue is "whether [the
directors] breached their more general fiduciary duty of loyalty and

92. Id. at 363.
93. Id. at 367.
94. Id. at 368 n.36 (inserting bracketed word "loyalty" following the words
"good faith" in quotation from Barkan v. Amsted Industries,Inc., 567 A.2d 1279,
1286 (Del. 1989)); see also Reed & Neiderman, supra note 65, at 120 ("In
Barkan itself, it is clear that the Supreme Court used the terms 'due diligence'
and 'good faith' as a fresh way of referring to the 'fundamental duties of care
and loyalty' it discussed three sentences earlier in the same paragraph.").
95. 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998).
96. Id. at 10. The court has also invoked the "triad," without explanation,
in other contexts. See, e.g., Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 726 A.2d 1215, 1221
(Del. 1999); Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 90-91 (Del. 2001) (making
numerous unexplained references to the "triad" in analysis of the effects of a
section 102(b)(7) exculpatory charter provision).
97. Malone, 722 A.2d at 11.
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good faith by knowingly disseminating to the stockholders false
information."' 9' The court does not, however, explain what the
difference between loyalty and good faith amounts to in the analysis
of knowing misstatements. The singular reference to a duty of
loyalty and good faith, together with their application in tandem to a
case involving the directors' state of mind at the time of the alleged
misconduct, may itself be telling.
A rare and somewhat illuminating comment on the nature of
good faith would come in Brehm v. Eisner99-a 2000 opinion by Chief
Justice Veasey that never invokes the triad or refers to a duty of
good faith. This shareholder derivative litigation followed Disney's
hiring and termination of Michael Ovitz, who allegedly walked away
with total compensation worth $140 million after a year's mediocre
service as Disney's president.'0 0 The issues before the court at this
stage of the litigation included whether pre-suit demand on the
directors should be excused, an analysis turning, in the instant case,
on whether "the particularized facts in the complaint create[d] a
reasonable doubt that the informational component of the directors'
decisionmaking process, measured by concepts of gross negligence,
included consideration of all material information reasonably
available."'0 ' In response to an argument made by the plaintiffs to
the effect that the director defendants had failed to exercise not only
procedural due care, but also "substantive due care," the court
explained that "such a concept is foreign to the business judgment
rule." The court offered the following explanation of the BJR
standard:
Courts do not measure, weigh or quantify directors' judgments.
We do not even decide if they are reasonable in this context.
Due care in the decisionmaking context is process due care
only. Irrationality is the outer limit of the business judgment
rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the
waste test or it may tend to show that the decision is not made
in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business
judgment rule.12
Veasey suggests here that, as a practical matter, the analysis by

98. Id. at 10.
99. 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000).
100. Id. at 248-53.

101. Id. at 259. Ordinarily plaintiffs seeking to advance a derivative claim
on the corporation's behalf must seek action by the board first, unless the
plaintiff can allege facts creating a reasonable doubt as to director
disinterestedness or as to whether the transaction would be protected by the
BJR. Id. at 256.
102. Id. at 264.
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which a court arrives at a finding of gross negligence overcoming the
BJR-which the court makes clear has literally nothing to do with
the reasonableness of the decision itself-may effectively require so
flawed a decisionmaking process that it calls into question whether
the board even intended to discharge its obligations. Veasey's
description could reasonably lead one to conclude that, in his view,
the BJR completely insulates the board from liability in all instances
not calling into question the propriety of the directors' state of
mind. °3 And in this light, one might reasonably further query
whether there is in fact any meaningful difference whatsoever
between grossly negligent conduct, which is exculpable, and bad
faith conduct, which is not exculpable, under section 102(b)(7).
In any event, by 2001, the court was back to its triad talk. In
Emerald Partners v. Berlin,04 an opinion by Justice Holland
addressing the pretrial effects of a section 102(b)(7) exculpatory
charter provision, the court referred again to the directors' "triad of
primary fiduciary duties."0 5 Here, however, the triad concept
appears to figure more saliently in the court's portrayal of the
fiduciary duty landscape, which clearly endeavors to reconcile the
disparate frameworks of the primary fiduciary duties, Aronson's
articulation of the BJR and section 102(b)(7)'s exceptions.
Starting with the triad concept of fiduciary duties, the court
proceeds to describe the BJR and section 102(b)(7) through that
lens. Following a recitation of Aronson's BJR formulation, the court
explains that a rebuttal of its presumption requires the plaintiff to
show that "the board of directors, in reaching its challenged
decision, violated any one of its triad of fiduciary duties: due care,
loyalty, or good faith." 1 6 Section 102(b)(7), the court likewise
explains, was intended to permit shareholders to exculpate
"breaches of their duty of care, but not. . . duty of loyalty violations,
good faith violations and," as if to avoid emphasizing other
exceptions not fitting the model, "certain other conduct.' 1 7 This

103. Such a conclusion would not be inconsistent with Veasey's reference to

"waste," allegations of which the court had earlier explained could be overcome
by the minimal showing of "any substantial consideration received by the
corporation, and . . .a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the
transaction is worthwhile." Id. at 263 (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). Given the unlikelihood that there would be literally nothing that
could be called consideration, it would appear that waste analysis-at least
according to this formulation-is itself really about the "good faith" of the
decisionmaker.
104. 787 A.2d 85 (Del. 2001).
105. Id. at 90.
106. Id. at 91.
107. Id. at 90.
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depiction of section 102(b)(7) in triad terms-i.e., precluding
damages for breaches of the duty of care, but not for breaches of the
duty •of• 108
loyalty or the duty of good faith-continues throughout the
opinion. The court even goes so far as to say the following:
When the General Assembly enacted Section 102(b)(7) . . .it
not only recognized but reinforced . . . a venerable and

fundamental principle of our common law corporate fiduciary
jurisprudence: "there is no 'safe harbor' for . .

.

divided

loyalties in Delaware." The fact that Section 102(b)(7) does not
permit shareholders to exculpate directors for violations of
loyalty or good faith reflects that the provision was a
thoughtfully crafted legislative response to our holding in Van
Gorkom and, simultaneously, reflected the General Assembly's
own expression of support for our assertion .. .that when the

standard of review is entire fairness [because loyalty or good
faith breaches are alleged] "the requirement of fairness is
unflinching in its demand ....
"'09
Though this opinion, like those employing the triad concept that
came before it, never explains what the difference between loyalty
and good faith is supposed to be, the passage quoted above renders
the triad's rhetorical function eminently clear. The triad permits
the court to bring the framework of primary fiduciary duties,
Aronson's articulation of the BJR, and section 102(b)(7)'s exceptions
(read loosely) into focus with one another-at least nominally, if not
in substance. So far as the Delaware Supreme Court is concerned,
the doctrine is of a whole, and section 102(b)(7), far from being an
internally contradictory botch job, represents a "thoughtfully
crafted" response to preexisting fiduciary duty jurisprudence. 10
B.

Life in Chancery

Notwithstanding the evolution of the Delaware Supreme
Court's thinking described above, life in Chancery pursued its own
course. Indeed, it would be fair to say that a parallel evolution of
thinking unfolded in the Court of Chancery over this period that,
while certainly impacted by the higher court's statements regarding
good faith, was far from consistent with them."' Ultimately the trial
court would come to view the intellectual bona fides of the good faith
concept with considerably greater skepticism, take a much dimmer
108.
109.
1983)).
110.
111.

Id. at 92, 94.
Id. at 96 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del.
Id.
One scholar characterizes this as "a true judicial schism."

David

Rosenberg, Making Sense of Good Faith in Delaware CorporateFiduciaryLaw:

A ContractarianApproach, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 505 (2004).
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view of the quality of drafting exhibited by section 102(b)(7), and
decry as effectively unworkable the triad framework set out by the
Delaware Supreme Court.
1.

The Good FaithState of Mind

The Chancery's (unreported) opinion in Citron v. Fairchild
Camera & Instrument Corp.,2

in contrast with the Delaware

Supreme Court's subsequent opinion affirming it (discussed in Part
II.A), quite clearly links good faith with the duty of loyalty. In
connection with BJR analysis of a challenged merger under
Aronson, Chancellor Allen explained that although "the absence of
significant financial adverse interest"-the paradigmatic loyalty
issue---"creates a presumption of good faith, or a prima facie
showing of it . . . the question of bona fides may not be finally
determined on that basis alone.""' Analysis of good faith "call[ed]
for an ad hoc determination of the board's motives in the particular
instance"-an "inquiry into a subjective state of mind" that would
"require inferences to be drawn from overt conduct," including "the
quality of the decision made.""' In the case at hand, "the board's
decision to act and its decision to accept the . . . proposal [that

plaintiff had alleged it had improperly favored] may not be viewed
as so beyond the bounds of reasonable judgment as to support an
inference that the board was acting in bad faith in accepting that
offer.' ' 1
As of 1988, the Court of Chancery essentially understood good
faith to be fundamentally bound up with questions of loyalty (to the
degree that the absence of adverse financial interest could itself be
viewed as "a prima facie showing" of good faith), and specifically
concerned with whether the directors exhibited "a subjective state of
mind" indicating intent to discharge their responsibilities. 6 Though
the board's exercise of care would be analyzed separately by
reference to process, the substantive "quality of the decision made"
could nevertheless still support an inference of improper motivation
11
(apart from adverse financial interest) implicating loyalty. '
Indeed, in the midst of his care analysis, Chancellor Allen even
refers back to the foregoing good faith analysis as having held that
112. No. CV-6085, 1988 WL 53322 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988).
113. Id. at *15.
114. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
115. Id. at *16.
116. See also Reed & Neiderman, supra note 65, at 121-22 ("[Flollowing the
reasoning of Citron, misconduct otherwise implicating due care could be so
egregious as to create an inference of bad faith, even absent an improper
financial benefit.").
117. Citron, 1988 WL 53322, at *15.
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the board's conduct "does not, on these facts, constitute a breach of
the duty of loyalty.' 18.
2. Good Faithand the Business Judgment Rule
By the time of his famous 1996 opinion in the Caremark case,19
however, coming after the Delaware Supreme Court's articulation of
the triad concept in Cede, Chancellor Allen formulated the role of
good faith in fiduciary duty analysis differently. In an opinion
approving a settlement of a derivative action that involved
allegations of breaches of care (but not loyalty) in failing to
implement systems to ensure the company's compliance with
applicable health care laws, Allen invokes good faith in a manner
that is difficult to square either with his own view in Citron or with
the Delaware Supreme Court's jurisprudence-though for reasons, I
argue, that only reinforce the fundamental link between concepts of
good faith and loyalty.
Allen states that "a breach of the duty to exercise appropriate
attention" will not be found "so long as the court determines that the
process employed was either rational or employed in a good faith
effort to advance corporate interests." 2 ° He then further ties the
concept of good faith to due care analysis, stating that "[w]here a
director in fact exercises a good faith effort to be informed and to

exercise appropriatejudgment, he or she should be deemed to satisfy
fully the duty of attention." 2 ' He then cites to a Judge Learned
Hand opinion in the tort context that "correctly identifie[d], in
[Allen's] opinion, the core element of any corporate law duty of care
inquiry: whether there was good faith effort to be informed and
exercise judgment. 2
This doctrinal move raises at least two important questions.
First, why would Allen characterize good faith as a component of the
duty of care, having previously (in Citron) characterized it as a
component of the duty of loyalty (to which evidence of actual conduct
could, to be sure, be relevant)? Second, why would Allen ground his
desired care standard in a 1924 tort case, 123 when his own effort to
apply that very case and its standard to BJR analysis (including its
requirement of proof of injury)124 had been roundly rejected by the
118.
119.
1996).
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
at *10

Id. at *17.
In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch.
Id. at 967.
Id. at 968.
Id.
Barnes v. Andrews, 298 F. 614 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CV-8358, 1991 WL 111134,
(Del. Ch. June 24, 1991).
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125
Delaware Supreme Court just a few years earlier?
Chancellor Allen makes clear in Caremark that, in his view,
there should be literally no exposure to monetary liability for pure
duty of care violations. "[O]ne wonders," Allen remarks at one point,
"on what moral basis might shareholders attack a good faith
business decision of a director as 'unreasonable' or 'irrational.' 12 6
Clearly Allen's answer to that question, in light of the standard he
urges in Caremark, is never. 127 It is interesting in this light to note
the depth of Allen's obvious distaste for the outcome in Van Gorkom,
to which he refers only once in this due care opinion-and there only
to dismiss it as part of the Delaware Supreme Court's
"jurisprudence concerning takeovers."128 Indeed, Allen adopts a
virtually intent-based test for the exercise of due care in the
monitoring/oversight context-under which "the lack of good faith
that is a necessary condition to liability" is established by "a
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise
oversight 2 9-notwithstanding the Delaware Supreme Court having
made clear in Van Gorkom that issues of motive are irrelevant to
due care analysis.' 3° The clear upshot is that Allen simply does not
believe that there should be any potential whatsoever for monetary
liability in pure due care cases, but, of course, he cannot go so far as
to say that because Van Gorkom-which by its terms is a due care
case not limited to the takeover context-made clear that there is
potential liability exposure for pure due care violations.13' Allen

125. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 368, 370 & n.38 (Del.
1993) (describing Barnes as a "seventy-year-old decision" that evidently was
"not cited by any of the parties in the briefings," and stating that "Barnes,a tort
action, does not control a claim for breach of fiduciary duty").
126. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 968.
127. See also ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 252 ("[I]f a director has no
conflicting interest, is reasonably informed, and makes a good-faith judgment
(by which we mean an honest judgment seeking to advance the corporation's
interests), what possible basis for liability exists? The answer, we think, is that
there is none-not because the business judgment rule exists but because there
is no breach of directorial duty."). For an argument that a duty of care bereft of
monetary damages for its breach remains an important component of corporate
law, see infra note 225.
128. Caremark, 698 A.2d at 970.
129. Id. at 971.
130. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985) ("[A] director's
duty to exercise an informed business judgment is in the nature of a duty of
care, as distinguished from a duty of loyalty. Here, there were no allegations of
fraud, bad faith, or self-dealing, or proof thereof. Hence, it is presumed that the
directors reached their business judgment in good faith ... and considerations
of motive are irrelevant to the issue before us.") (citation omitted).
131. Id.
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essentially end-runs Van Gorkom by carving off part of what he
himself had called a component of loyalty in Citron and simply
restyling it as a component of due care analysis in the
Indeed, Allen comes close to
monitoring/oversight context.
conceding as much in a 2002 article appearing in the Northwestern
University Law Review with then-Vice Chancellor, now-Justice Jack
Jacobs and Vice Chancellor Leo Strine, Jr., which includes the
following in a footnote:
In [the duty to monitor] context it has been held that corporate
directors will not be held liable unless their dereliction of duty
is in bad faith .... "Bad faith" is an element of the duty of
loyalty, not the duty of care, which suggests that "duty to
monitor" cases may be remediable only if the board's conduct
the duty of loyalty, as distinguished from the duty of
violates
132
care.
The footnote continues, "[t]he Caremark standard can be viewed
as consistent with the traditional approach in due care cases decided
before Van Gorkom."33
3.

Bad Faith as Disloyalty

Leo Strine, Jr., who became a Vice Chancellor in 1998,134 has
missed few opportunities to criticize the Delaware Supreme Court's
triad concept, and specifically the notion that good faith can have
any coherent meaning independent of loyalty.
In an opinion addressing a challenged merger, in which a
minority shareholder was provided very little information about
that merger and in which the total consideration was in fact left to
the surviving entity's board to determine (albeit comprised of the
same individuals who were the controlling shareholders of the
target), Vice Chancellor Strine explicitly rejects the notion that good
faith could be its own fiduciary duty. 35 Strine observes in a footnote
that plaintiffs "complaint . ..refers to the so-called 'duty of good

faith,"' and explains that "[b]y definition, a director cannot
simultaneously act in bad faith and loyally towards the corporation
and its stockholders." 36 He continues:
132. Allen et al., supra note 12, at 457 n.31.
133. Id. (citation to Caremark omitted, emphasis added); see also infra text
accompanying note 140; Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 506 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(Strine, Vice Chancellor).
134. Delaware State Courts: The Court of Chancery, Judges, http://courts.
delaware.gov/Courts/Court%20of%2OChanceryjud-off.htm (last visited Nov.
13, 2006).
135. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
136. Id. Hillary Sale argues otherwise, but only by defining loyalty to reach
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If it is useful at all as an independent concept, the good faith
iteration's utility may rest in its constant reminder (1) that a
fiduciary may act disloyally for a variety of reasons other than
personal pecuniary interest; and (2) that, regardless of his
motive, a director who consciously disregards his duties to the
corporation and its stockholders may suffer a personal
judgment for monetary damages for any harm he causes.137
Despite the fact that the Delaware Supreme Court had, for
seven years, maintained that there was such thing as an
independent fiduciary duty of good faith under Delaware corporate
law, Vice Chancellor Strine simply refuses to hear anything of it,
and implicitly criticizes plaintiffs counsel for having accepted the
invitation to include such an allegation in the complaint. Strine's
approach, indeed, is broadly consistent with that taken by
Chancellor Allen in his Citron opinion over a decade earlier; good
faith is essentially a subset of the duty of loyalty addressing forms of
disloyalty other than financial conflicts of interest, and specifically
cases in which a fiduciary lacks-in some sense "consciously"-the
discharge the duties flowing from his or her
affirmative intent to
138
status as a director.

See Hillary A. Sale,
Other
analyses of the status and proper role of good faith are similarly built on the
assumption that the duty of loyalty can address only conflicts of interest. David
Rosenberg's argument that good faith should be understood through the
contractarian lens as a gap-filler and interpretive principle broader than loyalty
depends critically on a narrow duty of loyalty. See Rosenberg, supra note 111,
at 493-94, 513-14. Likewise Sean Griffith's argument that good faith is a
"thaumatrope," mixing elements of care and loyalty while satisfying neither,
requires limiting loyalty to conflicts of interest. Griffith recognizes that
historically good faith "had typically been mentioned in the context of the other
two duties, most often as an aspect of the duty of loyalty," and cases to that
effect are cited but not discussed. See Griffith, supra note 65, at 5 n.11, 9-10,
19-20; see also Filippo Rossi, Making Sense of the Delaware Supreme Court's
Triad of Fiduciary Duties 34 (June 22, 2005) (unpublished manuscript),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=755784 (advocating that loyalty "be
confined to conducts which involve conflicting economic or other interests").
137. Nagy, 770 A.2d at 48-49 n.2. In the instant case the court determines
that in "the absence of evidence that the defendant directors made any attempt
to comply with their disclosure obligations, it is clear that a due care violation
has been demonstrated even under the exacting gross negligence standard,"
rendering unnecessary the production of evidence regarding whether "the
failure of disclosure was purposeful or otherwise indicative of disloyalty." Id. at
59. This does not, however, contradict the statement quoted above, which
categorizes conscious disregard of duties as a loyalty violation.
138. See also Allen et al., supra note 12, at 464 n.49 ("We use the term
'disloyally' in the broad sense of encompassing breaches of the duty of loyalty,
including conduct that is in bad faith, or that constitutes intentional misconduct
only issues of independence and disinterestedness.

Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456, 484, 488 (2004).
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A few years later, in Guttman v. Huang,139 Strine would further
develop this position (in a similarly gratuitous footnote), effectively
declaring war on both the triad concept and section 102(b)(7)'s
framework.
Strine explains in the text of his opinion that
Caremark, though "rightly seen as a prod towards the greater
exercise of care," in fact "articulates a standard for liability for
failures of oversight that requires a showing that the directors
breached their duty of loyalty by failing to attend to their duties in
good faith."14 °
Having thus thrown down the gauntlet by placing good faith
squarely within the realm of loyalty, Strine proceeds in a footnote to
blast the Cede opinion in which the Delaware Supreme Court coined
the triad concept. Observing that the same opinion "also defined
good faith as loyalty"-inevitably in Strine's view, since a "director
cannot act loyally towards the corporation unless she acts in the
good faith belief that her actions are in the corporation's interests"Strine comes to his larger point:
It does no service to our law's clarity to continue to separate
the duty of loyalty from its own essence; nor does the
recognition that good faith is essential to loyalty demean or
subordinate that essential requirement.
There might be
situations when a director acts in subjective good faith and is
yet not loyal [e.g., interested transactions], but there is no case
in which a director can act1 4in subjective bad faith towards the
corporation and act loyally. 1
Perhaps in recognition, however, of the degree to which the
Delaware Supreme Court's fiduciary duty jurisprudence had been
driven by a desire to render it consistent with the statutory
exculpation regime, as argued above, Strine reserves a few choice
words for the Delaware legislature:
The General Assembly could contribute usefully to ending the
balkanization of the duty of loyalty by rewriting [section]
102(b)(7) to make clear that its subparts all illustrate conduct
that is disloyal. For example, one cannot act loyally as a
corporate director by causing the corporation to violate the
positive laws it is obliged to obey ....

substance to
expanded to
requirement
fundamental

But it would add no

our law to iterate a "quartet" of fiduciary duties,
include the duty of "legal fidelity," because that
is already a subsidiary element of the
duty of loyalty. The so-called expanded "triad[U"

or results in the director receiving an improper benefit.").
139. 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
140. Id. at 506.
141. Id. at 506 n.34.
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14 2
created by [Cede], I respectfully submit, is of no great utility.

So there we are. By 2003, with respect to the place of good faith
in the pantheon of primary fiduciary duties, the Delaware Supreme
Court and the Court of Chancery could not have seen things more
differently. What to the Delaware Supreme Court looked like a
coherent system, in which common law fiduciary duties and the
statutory exculpation regime worked together in harmony by the
same terminology, looked to the Court of Chancery like an
intellectually broken framework in which the liability rules and the
very nature of directors' duties to the corporation were confusing
and confused, to say the least.
4.

The Ambiguous Ontology of Good Faith

Within a few weeks of Vice Chancellor Strine's decision in
Guttman v. Huang,4 1 Chancellor Chandler addressed a motion to
dismiss the plaintiffs' second amended complaint in the ongoing
Disney derivative litigation, which alleged that "the defendant
directors breached their fiduciary duties when they blindly approved
an employment agreement with defendant Michael Ovitz and then,
again without any review or deliberation, ignored defendant Michael44
Eisner's dealings with Ovitz regarding his non-fault termination.'
In finding that plaintiffs' allegations survived the motion to dismiss,
the court declined to weigh in on the crucial question of the status of
good faith vis-A-vis care and loyalty, but it did introduce what has
already become an influential statement of a generic fiduciary dutybased cause of
action for lack of good faith in cases involving board
4
nonfeasance. 5
Defendants argued that plaintiffs' allegations "cannot be read
reasonably to allege any fiduciary duty violation other than, at most,
a breach of the directors' duty of due care"-a violation for which no
damages would be available given Disney's section 102(b)(7)
exculpatory charter provision. 46 Chandler, however-consistent
142. Id. Observe also that Strine's hypothetical "quartet" of fiduciary duties
exposes the strained logic implicit in the Delaware Supreme Court's attempt, in
Emerald Partnersv. Berlin (2001), to render the core fiduciary duties, the BJR,
and section 102(b)(7)'s exceptions consistent with one another by use of the
triad. See supra text accompanying notes 104-10.
143. 823 A.2d 492 (Del. Ch. 2003).
144. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 277-78 (Del.
Ch. 2003).
145. Id. at 289; see, e.g., Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated
Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins, No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *44-46
(Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004) (reciting what had already come to be called the
"Disney Standard").
146. Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 825 A.2d at 286; see also 8 DEL. CODE
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with the spirit of Chancellor Allen's opinion in Citron fifteen years
earlier (and, incidentally, with Vice Chancellor Strine's position that
the good faith component of loyalty could reach conscious disregard
of duty' 4 7)-determined that a board's failure to act could amount to
something more than mere negligence or gross negligence:
[The alleged] facts, if true, do more than portray directors who,
in a negligent or grossly negligent manner, merely failed to
inform themselves or to deliberate adequately about an issue
of material importance to their corporation. Instead, the facts
alleged . . . suggest that the defendant directors consciously
and intentionally disregarded their responsibilities, adopting a
"we don't care about the risks" attitude concerning a material
corporate decision. Knowing or deliberate indifference by a
director to his or her duty to act faithfully and with
appropriate care is conduct, in my opinion, that may not have
been taken honestly and in good faith to advance the best
interests of the company.148
Thus, casting doubt on the consistency of the board's actions
with the BJR, Chandler found that demand was excused under the
Aronson test, 149 and found further that the alleged conduct would
"fall outside the liability waiver provided under Disney's [charter]"
because "[w]here a director consciously ignores his or her duties to
the corporation, thereby causing economic injury to its stockholders,
the director's actions are either 'not in good faith' or 'involve
' '0
intentional misconduct.""
Chandler's 2003 Disney opinion never refers to the triad of
fiduciary duties and does not explicitly address whether good faith
in fact constitutes a distinct fiduciary duty, and confusion over this
fundamental doctrinal issue has not abated. Justice Jacobs (sitting
as a Vice Chancellor in a case assigned while he was still on the
Court of Chancery) employed the Disney standard in a very different
context a year later, explicitly highlighting the lack of clarity in this
area.' 5 ' The Emerging Communications case involved a freeze-out
merger in which minority shareholders were forced to accept about
one-quarter of what Jacobs ultimately determined to be the fair

ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2001).

147. Nagy v. Bistricer, 770 A.2d 43, 48-49 n.2 (Del. Ch. 2000).
148. Walt Disney Co. DerivativeLitig., 825 A.2d at 289.
149. Id. at 285 (citing Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984)).
150. Id. at 290 (citing 8 DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 8, § 102(b)(7)(ii) (2001)).
151. In re Emerging Commc'ns, Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 16415, 2004 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 70 (Del. Ch. May 3, 2004), amended by No. 16415 NC, 2006 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 25 (Del. Ch. Jan. 9, 2006), No. 16415 NC, 2006 Del. Ch. LEXIS 26 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 9, 2006).
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value of their stock. 152 In light of the company's section 102(b)(7)
charter provision, Jacobs ultimately had to identify the nature of
any fiduciary breaches by a given director in order to determine
whether monetary damages could be imposed. 153 One individual who
assisted with the transaction, but did not directly benefit from it,
was found to have "breach[ed] his fiduciary duty of loyalty and/or
good faith" because his loyalties had run to the controlling
shareholder rather than to the minority shareholders. 5 1 Jacobs
explains in a footnote that he "employs the 'and/or' phraseology
because the Delaware Supreme Court has yet to articulate the
precise differentiation between the duties of loyalty and of good
faith" (and specifically whether loyalty breaches extend beyond selfdealing), but that, in any event, this director's conduct could not be
exculpated.155

Another director was also found liable for violations of "loyalty
and/or good faith" solely for having voted for the transaction when
(unlike otherwise similarly situated directors) he "was in a unique
position to know" that the price was unfair by virtue of his financial
and industry-specific expertise.1 56 For Jacobs, this special expertise
was relevant precisely for the inferences concerning state of mind
that it permitted. Conceding that "divining the operations of a
person's mind is an inherently elusive endeavor," Jacobs
nevertheless concluded that the expert director's conduct was
"explainable in terms of only one of two possible mindsets."57 Either
he "made a deliberate judgment that to further his personal
business interests, it was of paramount importance for him to
exhibit his primary loyalty to [the controlling shareholder]," or, "for
whatever reason, [he] 'consciously and intentionally disregarded' his
responsibility to safeguard the minority stockholders from the risk,
of which he had unique knowledge, that the transaction was
unfair.""18 That is, either he was indirectly self-interested, or he
violated the Disney standard-hence violating "his duty of loyalty
and/or good faith" (again, non-exculpable in either event). 59 While
clearly cognizant of the unresolved issue regarding its doctrinal
status, Jacobs nevertheless emphasizes the subjective nature of good
faith, its close relationship with the loyalty concept, and the manner

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at *142.
Id. at *137-38.
Id. at*142.
Id. at *142 n.184.
Id. at *143, *147.
Id. at *145-46.
Id. at *146.
Id. at *143-47.
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in which the requisite state of mind may be inferred from concrete
conduct and circumstances.
In his 2004 Integrated Health Services16 opinion, a
compensation case, Vice Chancellor Noble also applied Disney's good
faith standard for overcoming a section 102(b)(7) provision, offering
further interpretation of the nature of that standard. Quoting an
amusing passage from a hearing transcript in which counsel for
certain of the defendants expressed utter confusion regarding
whether bad faith would violate the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty,' the court simply observed that the Disney standard could
be read either way.'6 2 Although the court can be read to have taken
on the question for purposes of its analysis, 163 it never actually
answers it. It does, however, explore fruitfully the subjective nature
of good faith.
Having observed that the Disney standard "moves beyond gross
negligence,"16 the court explains:
As long as the Board engaged in action that can lead the Court
to conclude it did not act in knowing and deliberate
indifference to its fiduciary duties, the inquiry of this nature
ends. The Court does not look at the reasonableness of a
160. Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc.
v. Elkins, No. 20228-NC, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122 (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004).
161. Id. at *32 n.33. In counsel's words:
What could be confusing in the cases is that there's language-and I
don't believe that it's subtle-as to whether the bad-faith claim is a
subset of the duty of loyalty or not. For this argument, I don't care,
okay, frankly. The tests are there. We should apply the test. Prior to
the Disney decision, the cases lined up in saying "Bad faith is a subset
of the duty of loyalty and here's the test." After the recent Disney
decision, we have a bad-faith claim under a duty-of-care theory. I'm
prepared on this complaint to apply either standard.
It doesn't
matter; okay?
Id.
Although Noble would explain in Integrated Health Services that the Disney
decision in fact had not made clear the precise nature of its bad faith cause of
action, counsel here expresses the widespread doctrinal confusion-and
impatience at the failure of Delaware courts to address it-that has resulted
from the dynamics discussed in this Article.
162. Id. at *33-34 nn.36-37.
163. Id. at *33. Specifically, the court states that it "must determine
whether the Plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations, taken as true, amount to a
violation of the fiduciary duty of loyalty or the fiduciary duty of care." Id. This
task could be read either as requiring that the court specify the nature of a good
faith claim, or that it simply determine whether the conduct amounts to a
violation of fiduciary duty more generically under Disney's good faith standard.
I argue here that the court in fact answers the latter question, not the former.
164. Id. at *46.
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Board's actions in this context,
as long as the Board exercised
165
some business judgment.
Lest this begin to look like an objective standard, however, the court
makes clear that in its view:
[Tihe Disney standard is scienter-based. Thus, the Court will
generally be required to look to the Board's actions as
circumstantial evidence of state of mind. The Court, in
analyzing whether an action was taken with intentional and
conscious disregard of a board's duties, must determine that
the action is beyond unreasonable;
it must determine that the
166
action was irrational.
Although it may not be accurate to call the Disney standard
"scienter-based" in that it appears not to capture conduct that is
merely reckless (as most articulations of the scienter standard for
purposes of federal Rule 10b-5 securities litigation do),6 there are
larger doctrinal points upon which to focus for the moment. Had
Vice Chancellor Noble wanted to come out and identify good faith as
fundamentally linked either with the duty of care or the duty of
loyalty he could easily have done so, but he did not (at least not in
any clear way). Likewise, had he been comfortable calling it an
independent fiduciary duty, he could have done that even more
easily. Indeed, this would require nothing beyond citation to the
triad-a move never made in his opinion. Thus, the doctrinal
nature of good faith remains a mystery, though Noble has further
emphasized its subjective nature in a manner that is, once again,
reminiscent of the view Allen advances in Citron-thatis, intent to
perform one's duties as evidenced by what one actually did or did
not do. Additionally, Noble emphasizes that both Disney and
IntegratedHealth Services "involve Board approval of compensation
packages for corporate officers and directors." 68 This is a context in
165. Id. at *52.
166. Id. at *64 n.92.
167. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, 3 LAw OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12.8 (5th ed.
2005) (observing that the Supreme Court has not determined "whether a
showing of reckless conduct would satisfy the scienter requirement," but that
"the vast majority of the circuit and district court decisions have found that
recklessness is sufficient to state a claim under 10b-5"); see also Sale, supra
note 136, at 489-93 (advocating that Delaware courts adopt a scienter-based
standard for analysis of bad faith conduct, under which "a breach of good faith
need not be intentional or conscious," extending also to cases involving "some
sort of obvious, deliberate, or egregious failure" short of consciousness or
intentionality). It is argued below that there are substantial problems
associated with this approach to the good faith concept. See infra text
accompanying notes 230-37.
168. IntegratedHealth Services, 2004 Del. Ch. LEXIS 122, at *45.
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which board "deference"-which one might reasonably expect would
often express itself through inaction-is simply inappropriate. "The
board must exercise its own business judgment in approving an
i this light, the utility
executive compensation transaction, ,,169 and, in
of a concept like good faith-understood as being concerned with
intent to perform one's duties-becomes eminently clear.
More recently, Chancellor Chandler had another bite at the
apple in his August 2005 Disney opinion following trial ("Disney
2005"). In a lengthy opinion, drawing from over 9000 pages of
transcript, Chandler found that the defendants had in no way
violated their fiduciary duties, though the opinion reads like a hownot-to guide for directors with respect to corporate governance. 70
Like Justice Jacobs' opinion in Emerging Communications and Vice
Chancellor Noble's opinion in Integrated Health Services, Disney
2005 leaves the fundamental question open, essentially laying out
the mushrooming diversity of perspectives on it, including those of
scholars recently taking up the question.
Perhaps hoping to evoke a sense of doctrinal continuity,
Chandler states from the outset that "[u]nlike ideals of corporate
governance, a fiduciary's duties do not change over time."17'

Then,

in his description of the applicable legal standards, he comes to the
doctrinal issue:
The fiduciary duties owed by directors of a Delaware
corporation are the duties of due care and loyalty. Of late,
much discussion among the bench, bar, and academics alike,
has surrounded a so-called third fiduciary duty, that of good
faith. Of primary importance in this case are the fiduciary
duty of due care and the duty of a director to act in good faith.
Other than to the extent that the duty of loyalty is implicated
by a lack of good faith, the only remaining issues to be decided
herein with respect to the duty of loyalty are those relating to
Ovitz's actions in connection with his own termination. These
considerations will be addressed seriatim, although issues of
good faith are (to a certain degree) inseparably and necessarily
intertwined with the duties of care and loyalty, as well as a
principal reason the distinctness of these duties make a
difference-namely [section] 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General
Corporation Law.

169. Id.
170. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL
2056651, at *1, *39 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL
1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006) ("For the future, many lessons of what not to do can
be learned from defendants' conduct here.").
171. Id. at*1.
172. Id. at *31.
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Taken at face value, Chandler appears to say that good faith is
either an expression of loyalty or some type of subsidiary duty
derivative of the primary duties of care and loyalty (appearing
dismissive of the "so-called third fiduciary duty" and never citing the
triad concept). 7 3 In footnotes, he pauses for a sidelong glance at the
Delaware Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the issue, observing
that the court "has been clear that outside the recognized fiduciary
duties of care and loyalty (and perhaps good faith), there are not
other fiduciary duties." He quotes at length from recent work by
Sean Griffith suggesting that rigid distinctions between care
7 4 and
loyalty may be conceptually illusory (discussed infra Part IV).
Chandler backpedals somewhat when he states that Delaware
case law is "far from clear with respect to whether there is a
separate fiduciary duty of good faith," though he cites to and quotes
at length Vice Chancellor Strine's argument from Guttman v. Huang
that good faith can have no meaning apart from loyalty. 175 Chandler
writes that "[i]t is unclear, based upon existing jurisprudence,
whether motive is a necessary element for a successful claim that a
director has acted in bad faith, and, if so, whether that motive must
be shown explicitly or whether it can be inferred from the directors'
conduct."'76 Upon consideration, however, of what he aptly calls the
"hazy jurisprudence" on good faith, he reiterates commitment to the
standard articulated in his 2003 Disney opinion and goes further by
explicitly styling it as a form of disloyalty:
Upon long and careful consideration, I am of the opinion that
the concept of intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious
disregard for one's responsibilities, is an appropriate (although
not the only) standard for determining whether fiduciaries
have acted in good faith. Deliberate indifference and inaction
in the face of a duty to act is, in my mind, conduct that is
clearly disloyal to
It is the epitome of
177 the corporation.
faithless conduct.
Had Chandler stopped here, we might have (at least in the
Chancery's view) a clearer answer to the doctrinal question: Good
faith is a component of loyalty. However, Chandler did not stop
here. In an attempt to identify good faith with some sort of Uberfiduciary concept, he writes that loyalty and care "are but
constituent elements of the overarching concepts of allegiance,
devotion and faithfulness that must guide the conduct of every
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id.
Id. at *31 nn.400, 402 (emphasis added); see also infra note 243.
Id. at *35 & n.447.
Id. at *35.
Id. at *35-36.
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fiduciary," and that the "good faith required of a corporate fiduciary
includes not simply the duties of care and loyalty ...

but all actions

required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the interests of the
corporation

and its shareholders." 178

The practical

difference

between calling good faith a third fiduciary duty, as the Delaware
Supreme Court had, and calling it a catch-all category for fiduciary
duty breaches not addressable through care and loyalty concepts, as
Chandler views it, is left unclear.
The obvious question for Chandler is: What type of action or
inaction are we actually talking about here that cannot be addressed
through the duties of care and loyalty? Tellingly, Chandler has no
answer to this question. The "most salient" examples he can
identify of conduct to which the good faith concept is peculiarly
suited are where
the fiduciary intentionally acts with a purpose other than that
of advancing the best interests of the corporation, where the
fiduciary acts with the intent to violate applicable positive law,
or where the fiduciary intentionally fails to act in the face of a
known duty to act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for his
duties.1 9
Then, however, buried in a footnote, Chandler concedes that the
"first two of these examples seem to sound in the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, whereas the last appears to be an extension, or rather, an
8 °
example of, severe violations of the fiduciary duty of care."
Considering that Chandler has just styled the third of these
examples a loyalty breach as well (on the very same page, in fact),' 8
his concession makes clear that the notion of good faith as an Uiberfiduciary concept serves only to confuse what had been a relatively

178. Id. at *36.
179. Id.
180. Id. at *36 n.463.
181. Id. at *36 ("Deliberate indifference and inaction in the face of a duty to
act is, in my mind, conduct that is clearly disloyal to the corporation. It is the
epitome of faithless conduct."). Chandler later observes that "[i]t is precisely in
this context-an imperial CEO [Eisner] or controlling shareholder with a
supine or passive board-that the concept of good faith may prove highly
meaningful." Chandler grounds this claim in his suspicion that care and
loyalty, "as traditionally defined, may not be aggressive enough to protect
shareholder interests when the board is well advised, it is not legally beholden
to the management or a controlling shareholder and when the board does not
suffer from other disabling conflicts of interest," and that good faith could "fill
this gap." Id. at *40 n.487. This claim rests, however, by its own terms, on how
these duties are defined, and no explanation as to why "care" and "loyalty"representing very broad and adaptable principles of conduct--could not reach
such situations.
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clear analytical framework already capable of addressing such
misconduct. In a resigned tone reminiscent of the defense counsel
quoted in Integrated Health Services, Chandler essentially throws
up his hands, concluding:
In the end, so long as the role of good faith is understood, it
makes no difference whether the words "fiduciary duty" of are
placed in front of "good faith," because acts not in good faith
(regardless of whether they might fall under the loyalty or care
aspects of good faith) are in any event
non-exculpable because
18
they are disloyal to the corporation. 2
C.

Disney 2006: (Surely Not) The Last Word on Good Faith
Perhaps the defining characteristic of Justice Jacobs' opinion
("Disney 2006") affirming Chancellor Chandler's judgment in favor
of the Disney defendants 8 3 is the tension between Jacobs' desire for

doctrinal clarity in the area of fiduciary duties and the shortcomings
of the conceptual tools at hand.
The court rejects the plaintiffs' argument that the Chancellor
had applied a more stringent standard for "bad faith" in the posttrial (2005) opinion, which Jacobs interprets as a back-door strategy
to redefine the Disney standard altogether-a "verbal effort to
collapse the duty to act in good faith into the duty to act with due
care" by asserting that the 2003 standard had in fact required only a
showing that material decisions were made without adequate
information and deliberation.14 Jacobs adds that (were the court
inclined to accept it) the plaintiffs would fail even by their own
standard, "as the Chancellor and we now have held [that] the
appellants failed to establish any breach of the duty of care," and
concludes that "our
analysis of the appellants' bad faith claim could
18 5
end at this point."

Having set the stage by stressing the plaintiffs' apparent effort
to "conflate" the care and good faith concepts,'18 however, Jacobs
continues on to provide "some conceptual guidance to the corporate
community" through the "relatively uncharted" terrain of the duty to
act in good faith.8 7 With only a passing glance at the scholarly

182. Id. at *36 n.463.
183. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL
1562466, at *1 (Del. June 8, 2006) (concluding that "the Chancellor's factual
findings and legal rulings were correct and not erroneous in any respect").
184. Id. at *24.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
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literature,88 Jacobs goes on to address whether Chandler's standard
for bad faith "is legally correct," emphasizing the concept's
connection with disloyalty. 189 Never invoking the triad, Jacobs
explains that "at least" three categories of conduct would be
"candidates for the 'bad faith' pejorative label" and considers them
in turn. 90 The category of "subjective bad faith" involving "conduct
motivated by an actual intent to do harm" is an easy case: This is
"classic, quintessential bad faith." 9' The category "at the opposite
end of the spectrum," then, involving "lack of due care"-that is,
"action taken solely by reason of gross negligence and without any
malevolent intent"-is another easy case: Gross negligence alone
"clearly" cannot constitute bad faith. 192 Jacobs emphasizes that "in
the pragmatic, conduct-regulating legal realm which calls for more
precise conceptual line drawing," good faith and care "are and must
remain quite distinct"-a position implicit in the structure of the
statute, notably in section 102(b)(7) (which permits exculpation of
care violations but not bad faith conduct).9
The third category,
then, at which Chancellor Chandler had most directly taken aim,
involving "intentional dereliction of duty, a conscious disregard94 for
one's responsibilities," also constitutes non-exculpable bad faith.
At this point, having flatly rejected any conflation of good faith
and care, Jacobs becomes more circumspect on the precise
relationship between good faith and loyalty. Indeed, the discussion
of the latter category of "conscious disregard" of duty reflects a
studied ambiguity on their relationship.' 95 Jacobs is careful to avoid
making general statements about the scope of the fiduciary duty of
loyalty, referring more narrowly to "disloyalty in the classic sense
(i.e., preferring the adverse self-interest of the fiduciary or of a
related person to the interest of the corporation).' 96 Jacobs likewise
observes that conscious disregard of duty "does not involve
disloyalty (as traditionallydefined)."9 7 It is in this discussion of the
relationship between loyalty and good faith that the opinion is least
satisfying and Jacobs appears least sure of himself. Jacobs clearly
188. I am of course happier to have been string-cited than not. Id. at *24
n.99. As they say, no publicity is bad publicity so long as they spell your name
right.
189. Id. at *25.
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at *26.
195. Id. at *26-27.
196. Id. at *26 (emphasis added).
197. Id. (emphasis added).
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has not rejected an association between loyalty and good faith as he
did between care and good faith, though he does conclude that the
category of conscious disregard calls for a new "doctrinal vehicle." 9 '
Little explanation is provided, however. Even if we accept the
conclusion that this category represents an "intermediate category
of fiduciary misconduct, which ranks between conduct involving
subjective bad faith and gross negligence," 99 that would not
necessarily establish a need for a new "doctrinal vehicle." The
discussion, taken as a whole, appears to strengthen the association
between good faith and loyalty and roundly to reject its
identification with care, but the opinion leaves open the
fundamental question of the good faith concept's defining attributes.
Jacobs steps back from any categorical explanation of its scope and
meaning, as well as from the question of whether bad faith "can
serve as an independent basis for imposing liability." 00
Inevitably one can only speculate, but lingering uncertainty
about the relationship among section 102(b)(7)'s list of nonexculpable forms of conduct likely plays a significant role in the
ongoing ambiguity regarding the relationship between loyalty and
good faith. It is one thing for Jacobs to hang his hat on the
distinction between gross negligence and bad faith conduct to drive
home the conceptual divide between duties of care and good faith.
After all, they fall on opposite sides of the exculpation line. As
between non-exculpable forms of conduct enumerated in section
102(b)(7), however, it remains entirely unclear how to read the
statute. As noted earlier, separate enumeration implies that in the
legislature's view good faith and loyalty are distinct concepts.2 °' Yet
in arguing that bad faith represents an "intermediate category of
fiduciary conduct," Jacobs notes the distinction between bad faith,
on the one hand, and "intentional misconduct" and "knowing
violation of law," on the other, labeling the latter two categories
"subjective bad faith" 202-which

he earlier described as "classic,

faith."2 °2

quintessential bad
If this mode of reading section 102(b)(7)
is in fact open-that is, interpreting other elements of the list as
reflecting bad faith, notwithstanding their separate enumerationthen what prevents us from reading the entire list as illustrative of
loyalty, as has been advocated in the past, including by Jacobs

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Id.
Id. at *27.
Id. at *27 n.112.
See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text.
Walt Disney Co. DerivativeLitig., 2006 WL 1562466, at *27.
Id. at *25.
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himself? 2 °4 Perhaps Jacobs has laid the groundwork for such an
argument. But in any event, the tension between the structure of
the statute and the inability to ascribe distinct meaning to its
categories of conduct remains. Disney 2006 cannot be the last word
on good faith.
III. GOOD FAITH AND THE MARKET FOR OUTSIDE
DIRECTORS POST-ENRON/WORLDCOM

As late as 2003 it could fairly be said that outside directors of
U.S. public companies greatly overestimated the likelihood that they
would ever face out-of-pocket liability for breaches of the duty of
Although Van Gorkom had precipitated (or at least
care.
exacerbated) a true crisis among corporate directors and insurers
who had assumed that the BJR simply meant no liability for care
breaches, that case was a one-off--quite literally. The efforts of
Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner unearthed
just a single case between the years 1968 and 2003 "in which an
outside director of a public company [had] paid out-of-pocket for
either damages or legal expenses, under any source of law"-Van
Gorkom2 °5 (with which the Delaware legislature dealt swiftly). This
finding was all the more striking in light of what these authors
describe as the "conventional wisdom in the U.S." that "being an
outside director is often too risky," as well as the fact that "[flear of
liability is a leading reason why potential candidates turn down
board positions."" 6
How do we explain this? Black, Cheffins, and Klausner begin
by observing that "how directors respond to liability" in the real
world is of the essence.2 7 Directors by and large "do not know in
detail their liability risk under particular laws. They operate
instead with a general sense of how likely they are to be found liable
for something, under some law ... and how likely it is that nominal
liability, if found, will result in actual liability."0 8 The authors add,
incidentally, that "lawyers, the trade press, and D&O insurers,"
upon whom directors tend to be heavily reliant for their information,
"tell directors that they must be careful and vigilant and that
standards are tougher than ever," stressing "nominal liability, not
the factors that limit actual liability" 20 9 (e.g., insurance,
indemnification, exculpation, liability standards, and settlement

204.
205.
206.
207.

See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
Black et al., supra note 6,at 6.
Id. at 1 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Id. at 2.

208. Id.
209. Id. at 50.
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dynamics). In light of all this, it comes as no surprise that "outside
directors' incentives are skewed enormously toward risk aversion";
they "face unknown but potentially bankrupting liability risk,"
which could easily outweigh "modest financial and reputational
gains. 21 °
Following the Enron and WorldCom disasters, however, the
world arguably looks quite different, and risk aversion-particularly
with respect to outside director positions-appears perhaps more
understandable. Indeed, some of the recent high-profile settlements
involving alleged board wrongdoing have explicitly required some
form of out-of-pocket payment by directors. By 2004, the SEC had
adopted a policy for insider trading cases "requiring settling parties
to forgo any rights they may have to indemnification,
reimbursement by insurers, or favorable tax treatment of
penalties." 2 And the Enron and WorldCom securities class action
settlements (in early 2005) themselves required substantial out-ofpocket payments by directors ($13 million of a total $168 million
settlement in the case of Enron and $18 million of a total $54 million
settlement in the case of WorldCom). 212 These developments were
described as representing "a backlash against corporate wrongdoing
in which board members are being pushed to bear much higher
personal costs for failures in supervision."213
In the case of
WorldCom the lead plaintiff "insisted that the former ...

directors

pay a significant portion themselves in order to send a message to
other directors," and the $18 million to be paid by them reportedly
amounted to about twenty percent of their aggregate net worth (not
including residences and retirement accounts).2 4
Similarly, in the Delaware courts, Vice Chancellor Strine made
210. Id. at 51-52 (warning that while this "director-error story is surely
partly right," liability is just one factor identified by directors as reasons to turn
down offered board positions).
211. Stephen M. Cutler, Dir., Div. of Enforcement, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n,
Speech at the 24th Annual Ray Garrett Jr. Corporate & Securities Law
Institute (Apr. 29, 2004), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch042904smc.htm;
see also Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Sues Tyson Foods and
Former Chairman Don Tyson For Misleading Disclosure of Perquisites, 2005-68
(Apr. 28, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-68.htm (settlement of
charges alleging misleading proxy disclosures of "perquisites and personal
benefits" requiring payment of $1.5 million by Tyson Foods and $700,000 by
Don Tyson, former Chairman and CEO).
212. Ben White, Former Directors Agree to Settle Class Actions: Enron,
WorldCom Officials to Pay Out of Pocket, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2005, at E01.
213. Id.
214. Id.; see also Klausner et al., supra note 7, at 36, 38. According to the
WorldCom lead plaintiff, "one of the [former WorldCom directors] has filed for
bankruptcy and will not pay." White, supra note 212.
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news in May 2005, when he refused to approve settlement of a
shareholder lawsuit alleging excessive pay in a family controlled
company. The proposed settlement, with a monetary value of about
$2.9 million (in the form of a retirement plan advance and salary
cuts), amounted to a "cosmetic whimper" in light of the protection
shareholders required from the "grotesque lack of controls in a
company that also has no profits."215 John Coffee observed of the
move that courts in Delaware and elsewhere have "a long history of
settlements that look cosmetic and illusory but are accompanied by
the corporation paying a generous award of attorneys' fees," and
216
that in this instance Strine had gone "to the heart of the problem."
To be clear, it is not my intention to argue that these
settlements (or in the case of the latter example, the rejection
Enron and
thereof) are substantively unfair or inappropriate.
WorldCom, in particular, were disasters of a magnitude difficult to
comprehend, and they occurred on these former directors' watch. I
raise them, rather, to make a much more modest point: They change
the lay of the land with respect to risk perception in a fundamental
way, including for outside directors who, though diligently pursuing
the best interests of their corporations, might nevertheless fear that
such settlement tactics could be turned against them in far less
egregious cases and differing legal contexts.
Delaware's corporate law judges have, to be sure, taken pains to
emphasize the low risk of out-of-pocket liability faced by corporate
directors, notwithstanding recent events and the muddle of
As Norman Veasey, former
Delaware's fiduciary duty law.
Delaware Chief Justice, has endeavored to explain, while the "tactic
by lead institutional plaintiffs and the plaintiffs' bar in the
WorldCom and Enron settlements to require out-of-pocket payments
as a condition of settlement changes the risk analysis," its use is
likely to be confined, he guesses, to "those aberrational cases in
which the likelihood of director liability is high and exposure of
personal wealth is already considerable"--a situation most directors
are unlikely to encounter.217 He claims that "[tihere has been no
215. David S. Hilzenrath, Fairchild Executives' Settlement Rejected; Judge
Says Allegations Call for Better Terms for Investor Plaintiffs, WASH. POST, May

19, 2005, at E01 (internal quotation marks omitted).
216. Id.; see also Iveth P. Durbin & Katherine A. VanYe, Delaware Court
Rejects Settlement in Executive Compensation and Corporate Waste Case, 19
INSIGHTS 23 (2005) (observing Delaware courts' increasing protection of settling

plaintiffs).
217. Klausner, Black, and Cheffins are less sure of this, urging pension
funds to clarify their stance on demanding out-of-pocket payments by directors
in settlements, and particularly to limit this approach to "cases of deliberate
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change in Delaware law in the time-honored business judgment
rule," though he acknowledges "the emergence of 'good faith' as an
issue" that has "not been authoritatively resolved" and concedes, at
least implicitly, that it has resulted in some degree of increased
liability exposure for corporate directors.21 In a similar spirit, Vice
Chancellor Strine remarked in a speech that "[i]ndependent
directors who apply themselves to their duties in good faith have a
trivial risk of legal liability. Let me repeat that: If you do your job
as a director with integrity and attentiveness, your risk of damages
liability is minuscule."21 9
Accepting these statements as correct for purposes of my
analysis, it is nevertheless "the perception of liability risk that
22 not the objective reality,
affects directors' willingness to serve,""
and all things being equal (including actual liability risks), we are
far better off with a damages rule that is at least theoretically
coherent and comprehensible by market actors subject to it. It
remains the case that outside directors routinely overestimate outof-pocket liability exposure, and developments like those described
above can be expected to "increase liability fears among outside
directors",221-market

actors upon whom we continue

to place

increasing regulatory reliance following Sarbanes-Oxley. Obviously
Delaware's legislature and judiciary are not answerable for
settlement dynamics in federal securities litigation, but, as Veasey
acknowledges, the issue of good faith under Delaware's corporate
law is a source of confusion and anxiety for corporate directors. As I
have argued in this Article, the incoherence of Delaware's fiduciary
duty doctrine resulting from the interaction of the bench and the
self-dealing or egregious failure of oversight." Klausner et al., supra note 7, at
39.
218. E. Norman Veasey, A Perspectiveon Liability Risks to Directors in Light
of Current Events, 19 INSIGHTS 9, 10-11 (2005) ("[Ilt is my view that the legal
exposure to liability of directors has not been ratcheted up significantly, as a
matter of Delaware law."); see also Fairfax, supra note 1, at 415-20 (arguing
that good faith claims are repackaged care claims, reflecting post-SarbanesOxley fears of federalization of corporate law); Griffith, supra note 65, at 44-52;
Sale, supra note 136, at 459-60. Tara L. Dunn, on the other hand, argues that
Delaware's courts have long endeavored to instruct plaintiffs on adequately
pleading bad faith. See generally Tara L. Dunn, The Developing Theory of Good
Faith in Director Conduct: Are Delaware Courts Ready to Force Corporate
Directors to Go Out-of-PocketAfter Disney IV?, 83 DENV. U. L. REV. 531(2005).

219. Veasey, supra note 218, at 16 (quoting Strine, internal quotation marks
omitted).
220. Klausner et al., supra note 7, at 39.
221. Id.; see also Fairfax, supra note 1, at 450-55 (acknowledging these costs
and suggesting that regulatory reliance on outside directors may need to be
reconsidered).
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legislature over the course of decades has resulted in a doctrinal
framework that is self-contradictory and that, as a practical matter,
utterly sacrifices the "clarity" and "predictability" upon which
Delaware's corporate establishment has long prided itself.222 The

last thing this system needs is more of the very type of tinkering
that has slowly accreted into the morass we face today. It is a
system sorely in need of overhaul, and recent events in corporate
America have only heightened the urgency of this need.
IV. CUTTING LOSSES AND MOVING ON: REFORMING DELAWARE'S
FIDUCIARY DUTY FRAMEWORK

The reform advocated here is straightforward, and in fact flows
quite directly from the shortcomings in the current regime identified
in this Article: The Delaware legislature should establish by statute
that monetary liability may not be imposed on corporatedirectors for
breach of the "duty of care," but that monetary liability may be
imposed for breach of the "duty of loyalty," defined to include cases
involving financial conflicts of interest, other improper personal
223 Such
benefits, conscious malfeasance, and conscious nonfeasance.
a regime would effectively track what Delaware case law, fairly
read, already permits with respect to imposition of monetary
liability for breaches of fiduciary duty-including the relatively
recent line of cases recognizing a cause of action for what have been
styled bad faith omissions (i.e., conscious nonfeasance).
The statutory approach advocated here offers substantial
benefits over the current system. First, this system would eliminate
the need for a BJR in the imposition of monetary damages for
fiduciary breaches, as well as the various problems associated with
the vague gross negligence standard for overcoming it (adopted by
Aronson). Ever-murky distinctions between gross negligence and
negligence, on one end of the spectrum, and between exculpable
gross negligence and non-exculpable bad faith, on the otherdistinctions that are virtually impossible to draw in abstract, let
alone in concrete, terms-would be rendered entirely moot. The
notion that well-intentioned directors applying themselves to their
222. See, e.g., Lewis S. Black Jr., A National Law of Takeovers Evolves in
Delaware, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 25, 1985, at 6 ("The national prominence of its
corporation law is a source of pride (and revenue) to Delaware, and Delaware
lawyers, judges, and legislators work to maintain the law's importance. The
Delaware legislature considers proposed improvements from lawyers all over
the country.
The statute is fine-tuned frequently, but its clarity and
predictability are carefully guarded. Major changes in direction are rare.").
223. Again, recall that the language employed might take various acceptable
forms, and that an explicit exception for unlawful distributions could obviously
be included. See supra note 18.
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work could be found liable for monetary damages based solely on an
ex post determination that they had not done the job well-almost
without exception, a fiction' 24 -would be dispelled once and for all by
making clear that pure due care violations simply cannot give rise to
monetary damages. Equitable remedies (i.e., injunctions) would
remain available for pure due care violations by reference solely to
the quality of board decisionmaking, but the perception that
monetary damages could be on the table for such breaches would be
much more effectively combated than could ever be achieved
through piecemeal changes to the current system. 225
Second, and related to the prior point, the statutory reform
envisioned would definitively cast aside the objectionable doctrinal
aspects of the Van Gorkom holding while preserving its spirit. Even
though the vast majority of Delaware corporations have availed
themselves of section 102(b)(7) exculpation, the fact that it remains
an optional regime means that, by default, under Van Gorkom,
monetary liability could in theory be imposed for pure due care
violations. The statutory amendment proposed in this Article would
eliminate that entirely theoretical possibility.
It would not,
224. See Allen et al., supra note 12, at 450 ("[I]t is arguable that the pre-Van
Gorkom case law reflected a judicial aversion to reviewing director action for
any purpose other than identifying (and remedying) breaches of the duty of
loyalty.").

225. One might reasonably ask, in response to the reform advocated in this
Article: Why retain a duty of care at all if damages for its breach would in all
circumstances remain off the table? Indeed, one might point to the example of
Virginia, which effectively has defined the duty of care out of existence by
statute. See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-690(A) (2005) ("A director shall discharge his
duties as a director ... in accordance with his good faith business judgment of
the best interests of the corporation."); see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1
(2005) (permitting exculpation, but otherwise capping damages at the greater of
$100,000 or the director's cash compensation over the prior year, except in cases
of "willful misconduct" and knowing violations of criminal or securities laws).
Aside from the fact that care-related analysis would remain necessary in
other contexts (such as where injunctive relief is sought, or where a derivative
plaintiff seeks to demonstrate demand futility), there is almost certainly-as
Allen and Kraakman have argued-"social value to announcing a standard that
is not enforced with a liability rule," which, among other things, serves "the
pedagogic function of informing [directors] just what 'doing the right thing'
means under the circumstances." ALLEN & KRAAKMAN, supra note 4, at 253.
But cf In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452, 2005 WL
2056651, at *1, *39 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), affd, No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL
1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006) (observing, in an opinion absolving Disney's
directors of all alleged fiduciary breaches, that nevertheless "[flor the future,
many lessons of what not to do can be learned from defendants' conduct here").
This observation carries perhaps greater force in the post-Enron/WorldCom
environment; eliminating the duty of care outright would send entirely the
wrong normative message at a time when corporate America is struggling to
articulate and reinforce effective corporate governance standards.
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however, eliminate the courts' ability to address the truly
problematic facts in a case like Van Gorkom, were they to arise
today. Though I do not agree with those who claim that Van
Gorkom can be treated, under the current regime, as a takeover case
(pertinent only to those cases for which takeover-specific standards
were subsequently developed), 26' rather than the broader due care
case that it purports to be, I do accept the implicit point that we now
have a takeover-specific regime to deal with just this type of factual
scenario. Put differently, the regime that I propose, which would
leave current takeover jurisprudence (built to address loyalty
concerns) untouched, would in no way preclude a finding of
monetary liability on Van Gorkom-like facts, because such a case
arising today simply would not be viewed as a due care case.227
Third, by phrasing the statute solely in terms of care and
loyalty, the Delaware legislature could foreclose further fruitless
debate about whether another primary fiduciary duty of good faith
exists-a duty and concept that no jurist or commentator has ever
been able to imbue with a coherent set of positive content not
redundant with the concept of loyalty.228 The cases described in this
Article, in practical terms, appear to have said little more about the
concept of good faith than that it is implicated in cases involving
conscious nonfeasance-that is, inaction in the face of a known duty
to act-by corporate directors. The cause of action for monetary
damages that has evolved through the line of cases including the
Disney opinions would be preserved under this new regime; nothing
in the statutory amendment proposed here would foreclose it (or
prevent looking to actual conduct as circumstantial evidence of state
of mind).229 It would come with the substantial benefit, however, of
226. See, e.g., ALLEN & KRAAKMAN,supra note 4, at 518-19.
227. Cf Allen et al., supra note 12, at 459 n.39 ("[I]f decided consistent with
the 'enhanced scrutiny' analysis mandated by Revlon, with its emphasis upon
immediate value maximization, rather than as a 'due care' case, Van Gorkom
would not be viewed as remarkable.").
228. Cf Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability:
Rethinking CorporateFiduciaryLaw's Relevance to CorporateDisclosure, 34 GA.

L. REV. 505, 509-10 n.18 (2000) (arguing, in the corporate disclosure context,
that "it is analytically superior for courts and commentators to affirm that a
norm of honesty applies to directors' public communications .. .as a matter of
fiduciary loyalty doctrine, instead of searching for firm conceptual ground in the
notoriously murky world of 'good faith'); see also id. at 525 (observing that
"managers' duty of loyalty to shareholders does, of course, encompass a
commitment to further the prescribed objectives of the corporate fiduciary
enterprise").
229. Cf. Johnson, supra note 7, at 38-40, 61-72 (advocating a "due loyalty"
concept representing "the affirmative thrust of loyalty"). The fact that a finding
of conscious nonfeasance would typically turn on circumstantial evidence drawn
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clarifying that monetary liability can follow only where loyalty is
called into question, which in all cases turns on state of mind, not
the quality of board decisionmaking as an end of analysis in itself.
Fourth, the regime advocated here would avoid substantialand inevitable-problems associated with the "scienter-based"
approach that has been offered as an alternative. Hillary Sale has
conceded that adoption of a scienter-based standard "[w]ithout an
appropriate line between the grossly negligent duty of care
violations and those that are more deliberate and egregious" would
"raise the same concerns as those that followed Smith v. Van
Gorkom" in the mid-1980s. 230 The "key question" under such a
regime would thus be "how to define 'egregious.' 231 Sale argues that
federal securities case law "provide[s] guidance on what is simply
gross negligence and what amounts to severely reckless or egregious
behavior in the context of scienter," perceiving "a line based on a
connection between the defendants'
knowledge
and their
misstatements or omissions."232 However, the only case cited in
support of this assertion appears to define recklessness principally
by reference to the level of care exercised: "an extreme departure
from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or
is so obvious that the actor must have been aware of it." 233 This
would appear to contradict the plain language of the Disney
standard, which requires not merely some degree of departure from
ordinary care, but utter disregard of, and indifference toward, a duty

from actual conduct does not render this mode of analysis identical to a care
inquiry any more than does the fact that director conflicts-widely
acknowledged as falling within the realm of loyalty-are identified by objective
criteria. As the Delaware Supreme Court observed in Guth v. Loft, Inc., a case
articulating a widely observed test for the corporate opportunity doctrine, the
rule, inveterate and uncompromising in its rigidity, does not rest upon
the narrow ground of injury or damage to the corporation resulting
from a betrayal of confidence, but upon a broader foundation of a wise
public policy that, for the purpose of removing all temptation,
extinguishes all possibility of profit flowing from a breach of the
confidence imposed by the fiduciary relation.
5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939) (emphasis added). That suspect circumstances are
identified by objective criteria does not alter the fact that concern with
subjective bad intent-including preventing it from coalescing in the first place
by "removing all temptation"-motivates such manifestations of the duty of
loyalty.
230. Sale, supra note 136, at 488-89.
231. Id. at 488.
232. Id. at 490.
233. Id. at 490 n.266 (citing Franke v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 428 F.
Supp. 719 (W.D. Okla. 1976)).

2006]

DELAWARE DIRECTOR LIABILITY

1181

to act. Furthermore, once imported from the specific context of
shareholder communications to the broader context of a discharge of
a director's supervisory duties, it is difficult to imagine what the
relevant "danger" would be (of which the actor's knowledge would be
germane under the scienter standard) other than perhaps whether
the act or omission could conceivably have some negative wealth
effect upon shareholders 23 4-a "danger" present in essentially all
board decisionmaking. The scienter-based standard would thereby
collapse into just another strata of negligence (perhaps "super"-gross
negligence), an outcome practically invited by defining the standard
by reference to "care." We would move from two forms of negligence
to three-each with starkly different legal consequences, yet with no
principled means of distinguishing them.2 35 We would have simple
negligence, a showing of which would overcome neither the BJR nor
section 102(b)(7); gross negligence, a showing of which would
overcome the BJR but not section 102(b)(7); and finally bad faith, a
showing of which would overcome both the BJR and section
In light of the murkiness of these concepts and
102(b)(7).
terminology, one might reasonably predict a slippery slope back into
monetary damages for lesser forms of negligence-an outcome that
both the BJR and section 102(b)(7) were devised to prevent.236 In my
234. Unlike the Disney standard, the knowledge aspect of which clearly
relates to the existence of a duty to act, precisely because it calls into question
whether the director intended to discharge his or her responsibilities, the
scienter standard cited by Sale would appear to focus on knowledge of some
specific potential outcome-presumably manifestation of the alleged care lapse.
235. See Guttman v. Huang, 823 A.2d 492, 507-08 n.39 (Del. Ch. 2003)
(Strine, Vice Chancellor, unable to confirm, as of 2003, "[i]f gross negligence
means something other than negligence"). But cf DREXLER ET AL., supra note
40, at § 15.06 (arguing that unlike in tort, "where a jury must be instructed by
the court on the standards to apply in its deliberations, the characterizations of
the standard of care in corporate cases often amounts to little more than
affixing a label to a course of conduct in an opinion written after the court itself
has heard and analyzed the facts and formed a judgment on culpability");
Matthew R. Berry, Comment, Does Delaware'sSection 102(b)(7) Protect Reckless
Directors from Personal Liability? Only if Delaware Courts Act in Good Faith,
79 WASH. L. REV. 1125 (2004) (arguing that recklessness is a care breach and
thus exculpable).
236. See, e.g., DREXLER ET AL., supra note 40, at § 6.02 ("[T]o the extent that
[future] decisions reflect a greater readiness on the part of courts to impute bad
faith to allegations of careless, but non-self-interested, directorial behavior, the
public policy embodied in Section 102(b)(7), which is, after all, expressly
intended to protect directors from the consequences of their own lapses of duty,
will have been significantly eroded."). Griffith also criticizes Sale's argument in
this manner, but goes further, arguing that even intent-based standards
collapse into negligence analysis. See Griffith, supra note 65, at 30-33. Griffith
appears to ground this argument in the fact that both modes of analysis can be
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view, the Disney standard does well to steer clear of these problems
by requiring that one "consciously and intentionally" disregard one's
duties for monetary damages to become available (even if that intent
is inferred from actual acts or omissions)-a much clearer and more
coherent standard effectively codified by the reform advocated in
this Article, through its recognition as a component of the broader
loyalty concept.237
Fifth, the reform advocated here recognizes the fact that
exculpation of liability for care breaches is already (and long has
been) the de facto rule in Delaware, eliminating the additional costs
238
with drafting exculpatory charter provisions
associated
(admittedly modest) and any traps for the unwary, and-most
importantly-excising misleading and contradictory language from
the Delaware General Corporation Law.
Should additional
protections be required-say, among entrepreneurs going into
business together
(e.g.,
in small, partnership-like
close
corporations 23 )-presumably they could contract for them; the
contracting costs incurred in such limited cases would, I would be
willing to assume, be more than outweighed by the savings
associated with the far simpler and more comprehensible regime
brought to bear on the same conduct, but it remains unclear why this would
render them functionally coextensive-a problem more likely to occur with
recklessness, which like negligence, is typically defined by reference to care.
237. While some federal cases applying Delaware law apparently have
concluded that "reckless" conduct represents non-exculpable bad faith, the
consistency of their analyses with Delaware's case law is questionable. See In
re Abbott Lab. Derivative S'holders Litig., 325 F.3d 795, 803, 811 (7th Cir. 2003)
(applying Illinois law, following Delaware law, and citing McCall v. Scott
regarding exculpability of reckless conduct); McCall v. Scott, 239 F.3d 808, 824
(6th Cir. 2001) (applying Delaware law, holding that "intentional or reckless
breach of the duty of care" cannot be exculpated); Berry, supra note 235, at
1142; Reed & Neiderman, supra note 65, at 132-38 & n.104 (discussing McCall
v. Scott and Abbott Laboratories, and arguing that "[n]o Delaware case has

expressly held that 'recklessness' is the equivalent of 'bad faith').
238. See BALorrI & FINKELSTEIN, supra note 54, at 4-112 (observing that
section 102(b)(7) "is an enabling provision only").
239. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 341-356. (2001).
Section 354, in
particular, provides that:
No written agreement among stockholders of a close corporation, nor
any provision of the certificate of incorporation or of the bylaws of the
corporation, which agreement or provision relates to any phase of the
affairs of such corporation ... shall be invalid on the ground that it is
an attempt ... to treat the corporation as if it were a partnership or to
arrange relations among the stockholders or between the stockholders
and the corporation in a manner that would be appropriate only
among partners.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 354.
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advocated here. And in any event, such parties would still benefit
from the loyalty-based causes of action explicitly recognized by the
new statute, including for conscious nonfeasance.
Sixth, the proposed reform should clearly eliminate the need for
D&O insurance coverage for potential liability stemming from
breaches of the duty of care-an expense borne under the current
regime by shareholders to protect against a largely theoretical (and
therefore unquantifiable) risk.24 °
It must be borne in mind that fiduciary doctrines of corporate
law-though drawing upon larger cultural norms, to be sure2 4 -are
not really employed by the law as ends in themselves; they are
different means to the minimization of agency costs and therefore
the maximization of shareholder wealth. In the lives of investors
and corporate directors, they are practical duties that exist for
242
This fact has been lost (or at least
practical purposes.
deemphasized) in recent case law and scholarship writing about
these concepts as if their true nature, for purposes of legal doctrine,
were out there to be discovered.243 When approached in this way, we
240. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(g) (giving the "corporation" the power
to purchase D&O insurance). It should be observed, however, that "[miany
traditional D&O insurance policies intended to protect officers and directors do
not cover damages resulting from intentionally dishonest or criminal acts,
willful violations of law, or profit gained by a person who is not legally entitled
to receive it," broadly understood to represent "insurance-speak for acts taken
in bad faith or breaches of the duty of loyalty." Mark R. High, Disney Directors
Survive Attack on Magic Kingdom: Learningfrom the Trial Court's Opinion, 15
Bus. L. TODAY 18, 21 (2006). Some have speculated that bad faith conduct
would be insurable, though such speculations appear premised on the
assumption that bad faith conduct is not willful. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note
218, at 577; Rossi, supra note 136, at 15. In any event, whether D&O policies
covering bad faith omissions might emerge in response to the conscious
nonfeasance prong of the statutory reform advocated here (were it adopted) lies
well beyond the scope of this Article.
241. For an insightful discussion of larger social and cultural conceptions of
"care" and "loyalty" and associated norms of conduct, see Johnson, supra note 7.
242. See, e.g., Allen et al., supra note 12, at 451.
243. See, e.g., In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No. Civ.A. 15452,
2005 WL 2056651, at *36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005), aff'd, No. 411, 2005, 2006 WL
1562466 (Del. June 8, 2006) (describing loyalty and care as "but constituent
elements of the overarching concepts of allegiance, devotion and faithfulness
that must guide the conduct of every fiduciary," and eschewing attempts to
define "good faith" specifically, as it "includes not simply the duties of care and
loyalty ... but all actions required by a true faithfulness and devotion to the
interests of the corporation and its shareholders"); Griffith, supra note 65, at
36-43 (arguing that care and loyalty represent a "nested opposition," each
containing aspects of the other, that the "fundamental question" underlying
each "of whether a particular decision . . . is likely to be beneficial to the
corporation" is really the "good faith" question stated broadly as whether
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lose sight of the fact that, as analytical means toward a practical
end, their significance in the hands of courts applying them should
be as distinct modes of analysis-that is, distinct ways of reaching
that end. This is where recent arguments focusing heavily on the
interconnected nature of these duties, in my view, veer off in less
fruitful directions. To argue that care and loyalty are in fact the
same thing (or even that the distinction is highly blurred), based on
the fact that they both have the same ultimate aim, is simply to
mistake the means for the end itself. Of course they have the same
end, but this does not render the mode of analysis that each
represents identical to the other. As I have argued, and consistent
with the proposed reform to Delaware corporate law that I advocate,
fiduciary duty doctrine would be rendered substantially more
comprehensible and workable if the line between care and loyalty
were understood and treated functionally as an analytical
distinction between minimizing agency costs through assessment of
the quality of objective decisionmaking on the one hand, and the
quality of subjective intentions on the other. Beneath the surface of
the doctrine and the terminology employed, this has always in fact
been the difference between the duties of care and loyalty, and there
is no reason to think that we can identify a better line for the
imposition of monetary liability.
POSTSCRIPT
On November 6, 2006, as this Article went to press, the
244
Delaware Supreme Court (en banc) issued its Stone v. Ritter
opinion, in which the court affirmed Chancellor Chandler's
dismissal of a derivative suit for failure to demonstrate that making
demand on the board would have been futile. 45 The case involved
allegations that the director defendants of a bank had failed to meet
their supervisory duties under Caremark, and that consequently
they "face[d] a 'substantial likelihood of liability' as a result of their
'utter failure' to act in good faith to put in place policies and
procedures to ensure compliance with [the Bank Secrecy Act] and

directors are "doing their best in acting for someone else," and that in this light

"good faith" cases represent "situations in which one can answer the
fundamental question without checking all of the boxes for liability under either
analytic standard"); Johnson, supra note 7, at 27 ("[U]nderstanding the
affirmative facet of both the social norm of loyalty and the legal duty of loyalty
raises deeper questions such as whether the supposed conceptual distinction
between 'care' and 'loyalty' is as clear as widely believed and whether corporate
law fiduciary discourse should continue to be conducted in moral-sounding
terms at all.").
244. No. 93, 2006 WL 3169168 (Del. Nov. 11, 2006).
245. Id. at *1.
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[certain anti-money laundering] obligations"246 (the violation of
which by non-director employees had led to substantial fines2 47). The
allegations were ultimately found insufficient, however, to call into
and
disinterestedness
the
director
defendants'
question
independence, resulting in dismissal for failure to establish demand
248
futility.

In its analysis the court addressed the "standard for assessing a
director's potential personal liability for failing to act in good faith in
discharging his or her oversight responsibilities," 2 49 which brought
After
the court to the Caremark and Disney 2006 opinions.
approving the Caremark standard, under which "only a sustained or
systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight . . . will
establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary condition to
liability," the court observed that the Disney litigation had recently
addressed the good faith concept.2 5' The court then proceeded "to
clarify a doctrinal issue" regarding its nature and status,
articulating a conception of good faith wholly consistent with the
framework advocated by this Article.
The Stone court confirms that good faith "is a subsidiary
element" of the duty of loyalty, and that "bad faith conduct" under
Caremark and Disney 2006 violates the duty of loyalty. 25' Based on
this "view" of the good faith concept, then, the court identifies "two
additional doctrinal consequences." The court explains that while
"good faith may be described colloquially as part of a 'triad' of
fiduciary duties that includes the duties of care and loyalty, the
obligation to act in good faith does not establish an independent
fiduciary duty that stands on the same footing as the duties of care
and loyalty."252 In other words, the controversial "triad" is no more;
only care and loyalty violations give rise to liability directly,
whereas bad faith conduct does so only "indirectly"-by virtue of its
status as a component of the duty of loyalty. 2 3 Additionally, the
duty of loyalty itself, the court tells us, is not limited to cases
involving financial conflicts of interest254-a narrow conception of
246. Id. at *7.
247. Id. at *2, *3.
248. Id. at *3, *8-*9.
249. Id. at *4.
250. Id. at *5 (quoting In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
971 (Del. Ch. 1996)).
251. Id. at *6; see also supra Part IV (arguing that good faith should be
treated as a component of the duty of loyalty), Part II.B.2 (arguing that the
treatment of good faith in Caremark was in essence motivated by its link with
the concept of loyalty), and Parts II.B.4-II.C (arguing that the treatment of good
faith in the Disney litigation tended to further link the concept with the duty of
loyalty).
252. Stone, 2006 WL 3169168, at *6.
253. Id. Recall that this question had been left open in Disney 2006. See id.
at *6 n.29.
254. Id.
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loyalty on which numerous arguments for a distinct treatment of
good faith have rested, as I have pointed out in this Article.25 5
They say you can't time timing-as the emergence of the Stone
v. Ritter opinion on the eve of this Article's publication amply
demonstrates. It is of course pleasing, however, to see the Delaware
Supreme Court moving in the direction I have advocated here, and I
hope I can be forgiven for choosing to believe that the working paper
version of this Article may have played some small role in the
evolution of the doctrine.256

255. See, e.g., supra note 136 (identifying examples of such arguments) and
Part IV (arguing that attempts to identify conceptual terrain for the good faith
concept not redundant with the concept of loyalty have failed, and that good
faith should be considered an element of loyalty).
256. See supra note 188 (observing that the working paper version of this
Article was cited, among others, in the Disney 2006 opinion).
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APPENDIX
EXCULPATION STATUTES BY TYPE

257

ALASKA 6TAT. § 10.06.210(1)(N) (2005),
available at Lexis
ARK CODE ANN. § 4-27- 202(b)(3) (2005),

available at Lexis
COLO. REV. STAT. §7-108- 402(1) (2005),
available at Lexis
DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2005),
available at Lexis
805 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2.10(b)(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-6002(b)(8) (2005)
available at Lexis
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:24.C(4) (2005),
available at Lexis
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 13(b)(1 '/2)
(2005), available at Lexis
MINN. STAT. § 302A.251.4 (2005),
available at Lexis
MO. REV. STAT. § 351.055.2(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-19.1-50.5 (2005),
available at Lexis
OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 1006.B.7 (2004),
available at Lexis
OR. REV. STAT. § 60.047(2)(d) (2003),
available at Lexis
R.I. GEN LAwS § 7-1.2-202(b)(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-2-102(e) (2005),
available at Lexis
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-12-102(b)(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 1302-7.06.B
(2005), available at Lexis
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31D-2-202(b)(4)

(2005), available at Lexis

257. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
258. New Jersey's statute includes no explicit exception for unlawful
distributions, and defines disloyalty as knowingly acting "contrary to the best
interests of the corporation or its shareholders" where there is "a material
conflict of interest."
259. South Carolina's statute applies only to larger corporations, and
includes an exception for "gross negligence."
260. Tennessee's statute includes no exception for "improper personal
benefit."
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ARiz. REV. STAT. § 10-202.B.1 (2005),
availableat Lexis
HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 414-222 (2004),
available at Lexis
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-1-202(2)(d) (2005),
available at Lexis
IOWA CODE § 490.202(2)(d) (2004),
available at Lexis
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-C, § 202.2.D
(2005), available at Lexis
MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. § 450.1209(1)(c)
(2005), available at Lexis
MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-4-2.02(b)(4) (2005),
available at Lexis
MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-1-216(2)(d) (2005),
available at Lexis
NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 21-2018(2)(d)
(2005), available at Lexis
N. H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:2.02(b)(4)
(2005), available at Lexis
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-1A-202.1(4)
(2006), available at Lexis
UTAH CODE ANN. § 16-10a-841(1) (2005),
available at Lexis
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 2.02(b)(4)
(2005), available at Lexis
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-202(b)(iv) (2005),
available at Lexis

261. Alabama's statute adds an exception for "loyalty" breaches.
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CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-636(b)(4) (2004),
available at Lexis
GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b)(4) (2005),
available at Lexis
Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.2-020(2)(d)
(2005), available at Lexis
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-12-2.E (2005),
available at Lexis
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 402(b) (2005),
available at Lexis
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-2-02(b)(3) (2005),
available at Lexis
15 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1713 (2005),
available at Lexis
WASH REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.08.320
(2005), available at Lexis

IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(e) (2005),
available at Lexis
MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2405. 1(c) (2005), available at Lexis
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 78.138.7 (2005),
available at Lexis
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (2005),
available at Lexis
VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (2005),
available at Lexis
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 180.0828 (2005),
available at Lexis

262. Citations are provided to statutory requirements for the imposition of
monetary damages.

